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OVERLAPPING REMEDIES FOR INJURED HARBORWORKERS:
INTERACTION ON THE WATERFRONT
INJURED harborworkers, frequently protected by state law,' have also been
the subject of episodic federal legislation evoked by Supreme Court decisions
and by pressure groups representing various sectors of the waterfront econ-
omy.2 As a result, overlapping statutes combine with traditional actions in
admiralty to give these workers a proliferation of remedies-federal and state
workmen's compensation, tort recoveries and nonfault damages for "unsea-
worthiness."'3 Because each statute defines its own scope independently of the
others, claimants and courts attempting a proper choice of remedy are met with
intricate questions of statutory delimitation. 4 On their face, applicable fed-
eral statutes are mutually exclusive, each being self-confined to a particular
area of waterfront employment. Thus, the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA) creates a remedy in tort for employees of interstate railroads ;5 the
1. All states have enacted comprehensive workmen's compensation statutes which pro-
vide a variety of benefits including medical costs, lump sum payments for specified injuries,
disability payments based on prior wage levels and death benefits to dependents. For
description of the state enactments and items compensable thereunder, see DOD, ADMINIS-
TRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 39-53 (1936) (hereinafter cited as DODD); 2
HANNA, EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 16-18 (1954); 2 LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 57.00-64.00 (1952) (hereinafter cited as LARSON) ; SOiERS
& So Mr S, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 38-93 (1954) (hereinafter cited as SoMRS &
SOMERS).
2. See notes 5-7 infra.
3. The unseaworthiness remedy arose in American admiralty law in the late nine-
teenth century. It accords seamen tort damages for injury aboard ship resulting from
defective equipment or personnel. Shipowner negligence is not essential to the action be-
cause it rests on an implied warranty of seaworthiness. See, generally, GILMORE & BLACK,
ADMIRALTY 315-33 (1957) (hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK) ; see also notes 166-72
infra and accompanying text.
4. For a recent analysis and criticism of the statutory network with suggestions for
"the essential job of untangling it," see Gardner, Remtedies for Personal Injuries to Sea-
men, Rajiroadnen, and Longshoremen, 71 HARv. L. Rxv. 438 (1958).
5. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C., §§ 51-60 (1952) (hereinafter cited
as the FELA). The act provides employees of interstate railroad carriers with a tort action
for injury or death "resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its
negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats,
wharves, or other equipment." FELA § 51. Employer defenses of assumption of risk,
fellow-servant and contributory negligence are disallowed. Id. §§ 51-54. Actions may be
brought either in state or federal courts; the limitations period is three years. Id. § 56.
Prior to 1939, much litigation arose over the "interstate" status of plaintiff at the time
of injury; the general test was expressed as follows: "[W]as the employd [sic] at the
time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it
as to be practically a part of it." Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 239 U.S. 556, 558
(1916). This so-called "pin-point" test was explicitly overruled by statutory amendment
in 1939 adding the provision: "Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as
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Jones Act qualifies seamen as FELA-type plaintiffs ;" and the Longshoremen's
and Harborworkers' Compensation Act restricts longshoremen to scheduled
compensation payments.7 Many harborworker jobs, however, are not sus-
such employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in
any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall
... be considered . . . as entitled to the benefits of this chapter." 53 STAT. 1404 (1939),
45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952). See S. REP. No. 661, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. passim (1939) (intent
of the amendment was to reduce litigation on the "interstate" issue). For legislative
history of the amendment, see Ermin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 36 F. Supp. 936 (E.D.N.Y.
1941.). For treatment of the amendment in the courts, see HANNA, FEDERAL REMEDIES
FOR EmpLoE INJURIES 115-17 (1955) ; 2 LARSON §§ 91.10-.60; Delisi, Scope of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act-Recent Developments, 18 Miss. L.J. 206 (1947). The FELA
was enacted primarily to overcome the common-law defenses of fellow servant and con-
tributory negligence. 2 HANNA, EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
509 (1954). Passage of FELA was supported by railroad labor groups, who were dis-
satisfied with sporadic and ineffective state efforts to bar the common-law defenses.
SomERs & SoMERs 21-22, 318-19. Although over tventy-five bills have been presented to
Congress to replace the FELA with scheduled workmen's compensation coverage, none
have succeeded. Id. at 319. Organized railroad labor apparently favors the FELA scheme
of protection. See Griffith, The Vindication of a National Public Policy Under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 18 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 160-87 (1953).
6. Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (Jones Act), 41 STAT. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
The act provides that, "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his em-
ployment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by
jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the
common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall
apply . . . ." Ibid. For problems arising over incorporation of subsequent FELA amend-
ments and railroad safety statutes extending FELA liability, see GILMORE & BLAcN 296-301.
The Jones Act "was a little noticed provision, unrelated to the balance of the statute,"
and "as it made its way through commitee to the floor of House and Senate, it can hardly
have drawn much attention." Id. at 281. Its passage was prompted by Supreme Court
allowance of the common-law defense of fellow-servant in seamen's negligence suits. Id.
at 279-82. Although little organized agitation surrounded its enactment, seamen's labor
groups have since made clear that they prefer its tort protection to exclusive eligibility
under any workmen's compensation scheme. See note 159 infra.
7. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1952) (hereinafter cited as
the Longshoremen's Act). The act specifies benefits for particular injuries and accidental
death. §§ 908-09. The employer is liable without fault for any "accidental injury or death
arising out of and in the course of employment, and such occupational disease or infection as
arises -naturally out of such employment." §§ 902(2), 904(b). The act specifies that "the
liability of an employer ... shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such em-
ployer to the employee . . . " § 905 (a). Although liability under the act is exclusive, if the
employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required, by insurance or otherwise,
the claimant may elect to sue for tort damages instead of the compensation award. § 905.
The act is inapplicable to land injuries since it is limited to "navigable waters of the
United States (including any dry dock) . . . ." § 903(a). It excludes masters and crew
members, who are covered by the Jones Act, 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1952), and officers and employees of the United States, who are covered by the Federal
Employees Compensation Act, 39 STAT. 742 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 751-93
(1952). §§ 903(a) (1), (2). The Longshoremen's Act was supported by representatives
of longshoremen's and harborworkers' labor unions, but seamen's groups testified at hear-
ings prior to enactment opposing their inclusion within its coverage. See note 159 infra.
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ceptible of precise classification and permit claimants to choose between fixed
compensation and invariably larger tort awards.8 Consequently, courts seek-
ing to delineate the reach of a given federal statute must often apply a "place
of injury" as well as a "nature of duties" test, either of which can supplement
or supplant the other.) Because of the concurrent availability of workmen's
S. Some categories of employment are relatively clear. Persons who have signed
seamen's articles and work on vessels plying navigable waters are clearly within the
scope of the Jones Act and eligible for unseaworthiness recovery. GILMORE & BLAcK
282, 315-17; HANNA, FEDERAL REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYEE INJURIES 96 (1955). This same
seaman is ineligible for recovery under the Longshoremen's Act § 903 (a) (1) which
exludes "masters and crew members" of any vessel, At the other extreme, the long-
shoreman engaged in loading and unloading ships is clearly not a seaman for purposes
of Jones Act suit and receives his exclusive federal remedy under the Longshoremen's
Act when injured on navigable waters while obtaining state compensation if injured ashore.
Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946). But when he is injured while working
aboard ship he may be denominated a seaman for purposes of bringing an unseaworthi-
ness action against the shipowner. See cases cited notes 167, 171 infra.
Other employment categories not clearly in either the seaman or harborworker cate-
gory are less amenable to statutory classification. For instance, dredge workers and barge
workers have, alternatively, been labeled seamen for Jones Act purposes and harbor-
workers for state and federal compensation recoveries. See, e.g., Norton v. Warner Co.,
321 U.S. 565 (1944) (caretaker of barge barred from Longshoremen's Act as seaman
and crew member with sole remedy under Jones Act) ; Gahagan Constr. Corp. v. Armao,
165 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1948) (deckhand on dredge engaged in pumping sand from harbor
bottom allowed Jones Act recovery as crew member of vessel engaged in navigation);
Pariser v. City of New York, 146 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1945) (deckhand on harbor dredge
allowed Jones Act recovery as crew member) ; Fuentes v. Gulf Coast Dredging Co., 54
F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1931) (oiler and helper on dredge engaged in harbor filling operations
relegated to state compensation). See also cases discussed notes 123-34 infra and accom-
pany text.
Additionally, a heterogeneous group of harborworkers including ship repair and service
personnel may be classified either as maritime employees entitled to Longshoremen's
Act coverage or as maritime-but-local employees allowed state compensation remedies.
See cases cited notes 21-22 infra. Employees of interstate railroad carriers are usually
engaged principally in railroad work and subject to the FELA, but if their duties have
maritime characteristics, due to work on ferries, car floats or barges, their remedy will
be under either the Jones Act or the Longshoremen's Act. See cases cited notes 70-80
infra. On the variety of workers employed in and around the harbor and the cases
defining their proper remedy, see HANNA, FEDERAL REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYEE INhJURIES
13-14 (1955).
9. Both tests are applied before allowing an action for unseavorthiness damages. Plain-
tiff must be a seaman, and be injured aboard ship. See cases cited note 167 infra. Nature
of duties and place of injury may also interact to determine respective applicability of
state and federal compensation statutes to harborworkers. See cases cited notes 21-22 in!ra.
But nature of duties is supplanted by place of injury in disallowing FELA suit by a rail-
road worker injured on navigable waters. Even though not a maritime employee, plaintiff
is barred from FELA recovery because the Longshoremen's Act provides the exclusive
remedy for non-crew-members injured afloat. See text at notes 69-104 infra. On the
other hand, employment category determines coverage under the Jones Act irrespective
of locale of injury. A seaman and crew member may recover even though injured ashore
rather than on navigable waters. See cases cited note 112 infra.
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compensation in different jurisdictions, these tests, together with a determina-
tion of state power, may also be necessary to establish the relevance of local
law within the context of a maritime claim.10
The Longshoremen's Act was passed in response to Supreme Court re-
striction of state legislation." Arguing from constitutional inclusion of all
admiralty suits within the judicial power of the United States and the broad
enabling authority of Congress,' 2 the Court overruled state enactments work-
ing "material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime
law or interfer[ing] with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in
its international and interstate relations."' 3 This doctrine found its principal
expression in the 1917 decision of Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,14 disallow-
ing a state workmen's compensation award for injury on navigable waters,15
and in Court invalidation of two subsequent congressional statutes authorizing
state compensation for such injuries as unconstitutional delegations of ex-
clusive federal authority.'6 The Longshoremen's Act followed, designed not
10. See text at notes 36-68, 148-165 infra.
11. See notes 14-17 infra and accompanying text.
12. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1. "The judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction .... " Id. § 2. "The Congress shall have Power . . . To define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations . . . " Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. "To . . . make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water. . . " Id. cl. 1.1. "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." Id. cl. 18.
13. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
14. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
15. The New York Court of Appeals had previously affirmed the compensation award.
Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 109 N.E. 600 (1915). Typical of the abundant
comments on the case are Dodd, The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty Over
the Conwidn Law, 21 COLUm. L. REv. 647 (1921); Palfrey, The Common Law Courts
and the Law of the Sea, 36 HAzv. L. REv. 777 (1923) ; Note, Workmen's Compensation for
Maritime Employees: The Jensen Doctrine Re-Examined, 10 U. Cm. L. REv. 339 (1943).
The Jensen decision constituted a serious restriction on the scope of state compensation
statutes, the constitutionality of which had been approved by the Court only three months
earlier. New York Cent. R-R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (New York compulsory
statute) ; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) (Iowa statute allowing employers
election to come within its provisions); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S.
219 (1917) (Washington statute establishing an exclusive state insurance fund). By 1920,
on the authority of these decisions, all but six states had enacted workmen's compensation
legislation. For the history of this development, see So~mRos & SoMEas 32-34.
16. The two invalidated statutes are Act of Oct. 6, 1917, c. 97, 40 STAT. 395; Act of
June 10, 1922, c. 216, 42 STAT. 634, both amending § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, now 28
U.S.C. § 1333 (1952). The Judiciary Act gave the federal district courts exclusive origi-
nal cognizance "of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . .", but left
common-law actions in state courts, even though for maritime torts, by "saving to suitors
in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to
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as a pre-emptive exercise of the admiralty power, but as a saving effort to
complement local legislation by affording compensation only to harborworkers
ineligible for state remedy under the uniformity doctrine.17 The act was
give it. . . ." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 9, 1 STAT. 77. The 1917 statute added to this
"saving clause" the phrase, "and to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's
compensation law of any State -. . . ." This amendatory legislation was invalidated in
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). Wrongly assuming the reason
for disapproval was allowance of state action in matters too clearly maritime, Congress
in 1922 again attempted constitutionally to include harborworkers within state compen-
sation schemes by excluding from the "rights and remedies under the workmen's com-
pensation law of any State" all "members of the crew of a vessel." But this effort also
failed, the Court reasoning that, "except as to the master and members of the crew, the
Act of 1922 must be read as undertaking to permit application of the workmen's compensation
laws of the several States to injuries within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
substantially as provided by the Act of 1917." Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264
U.S. 219, 223 (1924). For this reason, the statute was held to be in conflict with the
Constitution which, the Court said, insures national uniformity so as to avoid "confusion
and difficulty" which would result "if vessels were compelled to comply with local statutes
at every port." Id. at 228.
Were similar legislation enacted today, it would probably be held constitutional, for
the Jensen uniformity doctrine has been greatly modified. See remarks of Mr. Justice
Jackson in Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 399-401 (1943). Even without national
legislation, state compensation might be allowed under the "saving to suitors" clause, as
amended in 1948, now 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952). This latter question is never reached be-
cause, prior to 1948, the Supreme Court sanctioned local compensation when state juris-
diction is problematical. Davis v. Dep't of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942), discussed notes
25-27 infra and accompanying text. In Jensen, the majority had ruled that state compen-
sation is "of a character wholly unknown to the common law, incapable of enforcement by
the ordinary processes of any court and is not saved to suitors from the grant of exclusive
jurisdiction." 244 U.S. at 218. Justice Holmes's celebrated dissent argued, however, that
state compensation should come within the saved common-law remedies, since "the common
law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign
or quasi sovereign that can be identified . . . ." Id. at 222. Under the 1948 amendment,
Congress accomplished by statute what Justice Holmes wanted the Court to do in 1917,
for suitors are now saved not their "common-law remedies" but "all other remedies to
which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952). Cf. Note, Effects of Recent
Legislation Upon the Admiralty Law, 17 Go. WAsH. L. REv. 353 (1949).
17. "Compensation shall be payable under this Act . . .only ... if recovery for the
disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be
provided by State law." Longshoremen's Act § 903 (a). See GILMORE & BLACK 339: "The
exclusion of on-shore injuries to maritime employees otherwise within the Act may have
reflected doubts as to Congressional power, in a statute passed under the Constitutional
grant of admiralty jurisdiction, to go beyond the highwater mark, or it may have been a
policy decision to leave as much as possible to the State compensation commissions."
It would seem that both reasons existed. On congressional "purpose to permit state com-
pensation protection whenever possible," see Davis v. Dep't of Labor, supra note 16, at
256. As of 1926, serious doubt prevailed whether the federal admiralty jurisdiction
extended to inland injuries, even to "maritime" employees. For early cases denying
Jones Act suit for seamen injured shoreside because admiralty jurisdiction was believed
bounded by the navigable waters limit, see note 98 infra. The following typifies the earlier
view: "In amending and revising the maritime law, the Congress cannot reach beyond
the constitutional limits which are inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
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limited to cases in which "recovery . . . through workmen's compensation
proceedings may not validly be provided by State law" and to injuries occurring
upon the "navigable waters of the United States.""'
Superficially clear, the relation of the Longshoremen's Act to state statutes
proved complex in practice. Uncertainty over the Court's uniformity require-
ment,"9 as incorporated in the "validly provided" clause,20 was early com-
pounded by a second judicial doctrine---"maritime-but-local"-allowing state
action in cases arising on navigable waters but of limited federal concern.2 1
Unless the injuries to which the Act relates occur upon the navigable waters of the United
States, they fall outside that jurisdiction." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932)
(dictum).
Even before the Longshoremen's Act, although the Jensen uniformity doctrine pre-
cluded state compensation for longshoremen injured on navigable waters, that doctrine
did not pre-empt local remedy for shoreside injury to the same workers. State Industrial
Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922). By 1943, all doubt was resolved and
the federal district courts were allowed, under the constitutional grant of admiralty
power, to provide a congressionally enacted remedy for injuries ashore. O'Donnell v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 39, 42 (1943) ; cases cited note 98 infra.
In 1948, the Act for the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction, 62 STAT. 496 (1948), 46
U.S.C. § 740 (1952), conferred jurisdiction on the district courts for all injuries "caused
by a vessel . . . notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated
on land." See Farver, The Extension of Admdralty Jurisdiction To Include Maritiuw
Torts, 37 GEo. L.J. 252 (1949) ; Note, 1.7 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 353 (1949).
18. Longshoremen's Act § 903(a).
19. Even in its most sweeping exercise of the uniformity doctrine, the Supreme
Court admitted that state law may change or modify the general maritime law "to some
extent." Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917). The history of the
uniformity doctrine is traced in Morrison, Workien's Compensation and the Maritime
Law, 38 YALE L.J. 472 (1929).
20. To grant local relief, the state commission must find that compensation could be
"validly provided" without violating the "uniformity" of federal maritime law under
Jensen, for Congress in enacting the Longshoremen's Act was judicially held to have
adopted the Jensen line of demarcation. See Davis v. Dep't of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 256
(1942). But see criticism of this interpretation at note 26 infra. In Jensen, the Court
said that the general maritime law was subject to some local intrusions. Note 19 supra.
But considerable doubt remained over the extent to which local action might proceed
without illegally impairing uniformity in maritime law. Allowable exceptions were decided
on a case-by-case basis, which furnished no sure guide for claimants unable to find a
precedent directly in point. See notes 21-22 infra for the variety of cases held to fall
on each side of the dividing line.
21. "Maritime-but-local" means that, weighing the circumstances of the individual
case, a court finds sufficient local ties and a sufficient lack of international implications to
justify state action in a maritime matter. The doctrine was first enunciated in Western
Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921), in which the statute of limitations under a state
wrongful death statute was held to bar a negligence suit for a maritime tort fatally
injuring a longshoreman while working in the hold of an anchored vessel. It was ex-
tended to workmen's compensation in Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S.
469 (1922), in which a carpenter injured on navigable waters while working on an un-
completed vessel was allowed state compensation. For general outlines and critical discus-
sion of the maritime-but-local cases, see 1 BENEDICr, AmRcICAN ADmIRALTY §§ 34-35 (5th
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The borderline claimant, therefore, had both to outguess Jensen and to deduce
the import of numerous fact situations in maritime-but-local decisions.22 If
he made an incorrect jurisdictional choice, and on adjudication the statute of
limitations had run under alternative law, he went remediless.2 3 Even if he
avoided the time bar, delay and expense were increased by repeated litigation.
ed. 1925) ; GILATOR & BLACK 346-49; Dickinson & Andrews, A Decade of Admiralty in. the
Supreme Court of the United States, 36 CALIF. L. REv. 169, 179 (1948); Comment, The
Tangled Seine: A Survey of Maritime Personal Injury Remedies, 57 YALE LJ. 243, 269
n.125 (1947); Note, Jurisdiction of State and Federal Compensation Agencies Over
Injuries Occurring on Navigable Waters, 53 YALE L.J. 348, 351 nn.8-9 (1944) ; Note, 19
WAsH. L. REv. 32, 34 (1944).
22. Typical of cases holding maritime torts to be local in nature were Carlin Constr.
Co. v. Heaney, 299 U.S. 41 (1936) (land-based construction worker injured on boat
while going to work on coastal island) ; Sultan Ry. & Timber Co. v. Dep't of Labor,
277 U.S. 135 (1928) (logger injured while constructing booms for logs on navigable
waters); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 276 U.S. 467 (1928)
(fisherman-cannery helper injured while pushing boat off shore into water) ; Rosengrant
v. Havard, 273 U.S. 664 (1927), affirming per curiam sub nora. Ex parte Rosengrant, 213
Ala. 202, 104 So. 409 (1926) (lumber checker on barge) ; Miller's Indemnity Underwriters
Co. v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926) (diver fatally injured while sawing off timbers of aban-
doned launching ways). See also State Industrial Bd. v. Terry & Tench Co., 273 U.S. 639
(1926) (worker building pier from floating raft) ; Fuentes v. Gulf Coast Dredging Co.,
54 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1931) (worker on dredge pumping silt from harbor bottom).
The following were held to be outside the scope of maritime-but-local under the
Jensen doctrine. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941) (janitor assigned
temporary duty of helping place outboard motors on pleasure craft drowned during short
testing trip) ; Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233 (1930) (worker,
who had such duties infrequently, injured while unloading ship) ; London Guaranty & Acc.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 279 U.S. 109 (1929) (worker employed to handle
pleasure craft fatally injured about one mile from shore) ; Northern Coal & Dock Co. v.
Strand, 278 U.S. 142, 144 (1928) (longshoreman who "worked for the major portion of
the time upon land" injured on ship while unloading coal) ; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479 (1923) (boilermaker fatally injured while repairing
scow moored on navigable waters) ; Union Oil Co. v. Pillsbury, 63 F.2d 925 (9th Cir.
1933) (watchman injured on vessel in dry dock).
23. The time limit for filing claim under the Longshoremen's Act § 913(a) is one
year from the date of injury or death. Most state acts have two distinct limitation periods,
one for notice of injury to the employer-usually "as soon as practicable or a period of
a few weeks or months," and a second, longer period for filing claim with the compensation
commission. The second period varies between one and two years. In some states, the
statute is tolled during period of voluntary payments by the employer; in others, the
statute runs from the date of employer's rejection of the claim. See 2 LA~sox §§ 7820-
.43(a) ; id. at 556-57 (app., table 19). Under the Longshoremen's Act § 913(a), payment
of any compensation extends the filing period to one year after the date of last payment.
See, e.g., Marshall v. Pletz, 317 U.S. 383 (1943); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v.
Brown, 47 F.2d 265 (N.D. Ill. 1930).
In Ayers v. Parker, 15 F. Supp. 447 (D. Md. 1936), the widow of a deceased worker
was denied compensation by the federal deputy commissioner since the claim was not
filed within one year of her husband's death. She had used up the one-year period
prosecuting a claim for state compensation, denied by the state commissioner and state
court on grounds that, because the fatal illness developed while decedent was working on
navigable waters, claimant's exclusive remedy was federal compensation. Arundel Corp.
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To avoid the rigors of its uniformity and maritime-but-local formulas, the
Supreme Court, in Davis v. Dep't of Labor,2 4 created a margin of statutory
choice for compensation claimants. In that case, which involved accidental
death on navigable waters, the state court below found no authority for
jurisdiction under maritime-but-local and denied compensation.2 5 Remand-
ing for a state award, the Supreme Court said that the case fell within a "twi-
light zone" of doubt and confusion, and held that under the circumstances the
first forum selected by claimant should be presumed correct.26 The Court
v. Ayers, 167 Md. 569, 175 Ati. 586 (1934). The suit for state compensation was held
by the district court not to be "in law or admiralty to recover damages on account of the
injury," which would have tolled the federal statute of limitations, Longshoremen's Act
§ 913(d), until adjudication of the prior action. Ayers v. Parker, supra at 449-50. For text
of § 913(d), see note 73 infra. For similar decisions, see Dawson v. Jahncke Drydock, Inc.,
33 F. Supp. 668 (E.D. La. 1940); Romaniivk v. Locke, 3 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
24. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
25. 12 Wash. 2d 349, 121 P.2d 365 (1942). The decedent, a structural steel worker,
was aboard a barge on a navigable river cutting steel from a drawbridge at the time of
fatal injury. 317 U.S. at 251.
26. The immediate purpose of the decision was to mitigate the hardship which
operation of the statute of limitations could work on claimants denied recovery for juris-
dictional reasons on their initial compensation suit. Id. at 254. But such protection was
actually needed only for the claimant ignorant of his alternative rights from the outset.
Where he knew of the alternatives, but was uncertain as to proper choice, he could assure
himself a remedy by filing simultaneous claims, if the federal claim was his second choice,
within a one-year period as specified by Longshoremen's Act §§ 913 (a), (d). Note, Juris-
diction of State and Federal Compensation Agencies Over Injuries Occurring on Navi-
gable Waters, 53 YALE L.J. 348, 354 (1.944) ; see Ayers v. Parker, 15 F. Supp. 447, 452
(D. Md. 1936) (dictum).
Referring to the claimant barred by the statute of limitations, Justice Black wrote for
the majority: "Such a result defeats the purpose of the federal act, which seeks to give
'to these hard-working men, engaged in a somewhat hazardous employment, the justice
involved in the modern principle of compensation,' and the state Acts such as the one before
us which alms at 'sure and certain relief for workmen.' " 317 U.S. at 254, citing S. REP.
No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1927), and Rm. REv. STAT. § 7673 (1932) (Wash.).
In exercising a presumption for the choice of state remedy, Justice Black compared
the allowable degree of state intrusion on the uniform federal admiralty law with the
previously considered question whether application of a particular state act unduly burdens
interstate commerce. In the latter situation, he noted, the Court had "relied heavily
on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the state statute." 317 U.S. at 257.
Realizing that the effect of the decision was to negate the uniformity doctrine for all
practical purposes, Chief Justice Stone, in dissent, urged that the twilight zone doctrine
was possible only through a direct overruling of Jensen. Id. at 262-63. But the majority
reasoned that to overrule Jensen would be to overrule congressional intent reflected in the
Longshoremen's Act, which had "accepted the Jensen line of demarcation between state
and federal jurisdiction." Id. at 256. That no such intent prevailed in 1927 is indicated by
Congress' pre-1927 efforts to supersede Jensen and provide state compensation despite
possible intrusions on uniform admiralty law. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
Further, by 1927, the viability of Jensen had been greatly lessened by the well-established
maritime-but-local doctrine. See notes 21-22 supra.
For thorough discussion of the Davis case and its implications, see GILmORE & BLACK
347-55; Rodes, Workmen's Compensation for Maritime Employees: Obscurity in the
Twilight Zone, 68 HARv. L. REv. 637 (1955); Note, 53 YALE L.J. 348 (1944).
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implied that an initial claim under the Longshoremen's Act would also have
been effective.2 7 Although Davis involved a fact situation in which state juris-
diction under maritime-but-local was unclear,28 the Court later confirmed that
decision's free-choice implications by following it not only in cases for which
earlier precedent unequivocally indicated proper law 29 but also in resolving
whether injury occurred within the geographical purview of the Longshore-
men's Act.30 Thus, the outer limits of the twilight zone, though still unde-
fined, are probably coextensive with the interaction of federal and state com-
pensation laws.31
27. Justice Black intimated that the Court would have exercised a presumption for
that choice under the established doctrine of respect for the findings of a federal administra-
tive agency. 317 U.S. at 256-57. As pointed out by Chief Justice Stone in dissent, the decision
thus poses an absolute free choice for twilight zone claimants. Id. at 260-64.
28. The Court said the reason for preserving claimant's first choice was that "the
most competent counsel" were unable to predict with certainty his proper remedy under
maritime-but-local. Id. at 255.
29. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948) ; Baskin v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854 (1949).
In Moores, the state court had allowed local compensation for a worker injured on
board a commissioned vessel undergoing repairs in floating drydock. Although confronted
with three federal cases and one of its own holding repair work on a completed vessel to
be outside maritime-but-local, and thus outside the scope of state statutes under Jensen, the
state court interpreted Davis to mean claimant's first choice must be confirmed without
any search for maritime-but-local precedents. Moores's [sic] Case, 323 Mass. 162, 80
N.E.2d 478 (1948) ; 2 LARsoN § 89.25. The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam, relying
on Davis. 335 U.S. at 874.
In Baskin, the state court of appeals had affirmed administrative denial of state com-
pensation for a shipyard worker injured aboard a completed vessel, since no maritime-
but-local precedent supported the case. Baskin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 89 Cal. App.
2d 632, 201 P.2d 549 (1949). Citing Davis and Moores, the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded for state compensation. 338 U.S. at 854. After state award was made, the case
was again appealed on the ground that claimant was barred from state compensation after
electing federal jurisdiction by acceptance of voluntary payments under the Longshoremen's
Act. Kaiser Co. v. Baskin, 97 Cal. App. 2d 257, 217 P.2d 733 (1950). The state court
rejected this defense and was affirmed per curiam. Kaiser Co. v. Baskin, 340 U.S. 886
(1950).
30. The Longshoremen's Act is applicable only for injuries on "navigable waters of the
United States (including any dry dock) ...." § 903 (a). In Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v.
Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (1953), affirming per curiam 201 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1953), the
Supreme Court relied on Davis to allow federal compensation for injury occurring on a
marine railway four hundred feet from the water, the railway being denominated a "dry
dock." See also Western Boat Bldg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1952).
31. To date, no court has barred a claimant from recovery as being outside the twilight
zone. See GILMORE & BLACK 352-53. One commentator has concluded from the cases
that "any case doubtful enough to be litigated is doubtful enough to be included in the
twilight zone." Rodes, supra note 26, at 643-44 n28. But see dictum in Chappell v. C. D.
Johnson Lumber Corp., 112 F. Supp. 625 (D. Ore. 1953) (spotter on lumber barge said to
be outside the twilight zone on federal side as maritime employee).
The following cases, all subsequent to Davis, affirmed claimant's choice of state com-
pensation. Allisot v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 4 N.J. 445, 73 A.2d 153
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Operating to assure claimants of their chosen remedies, twilight zone doc-
trine poses new questions of statutory delimitation while suggesting answers
to old ones. Within the framework of its original application, the doctrine
implies that free choice between federal and state compensation might continue
after an award so that a claimant could subsequently seek his alternative
remedy.32 Within three other areas of statutory overlap, Davis may, by analogy,
provide new flexibility for resolving borderline cases. The first of these areas
comprises railroad workers whose duties require their presence on navigable
waters; though currently restricted to compensation payments if injured afloat,
these employees continue to pursue their customary FELA tort recoveries. 33
The second is similar, involving harborworkers who, injured aboard ship or
otherwise qualifying as seamen, eschew the Longshoremen's Act to bring tort
suit under either the Jones Act or the admiralty doctrine of unseaworthiness.34
The third embraces conflict between the Jones Act and state compensation
statutes. 35 This Comment will analyze current law governing these problems
of remedial interaction and will present certain suggestions for fulfilling legis-
lative intent while promoting doctrinal consistency.
(1950) (painter injured while working on completed vessel) ; Schacht v. Nicolaisen, 283
App. Div. 902, 129 N.Y.S.2d 871 (3d Dep't 1954) (diver fatally injured while operating
from barge) ; Commissioner v. Oceanic Serv. Corp., 276 App. Div. 725, 97 N.Y.S.2d 401
(3d Dep't 1950) (guard on moored ship); Eldredge v. Weidler, 274 App. Div. 138, 81
N.Y.S.2d 58 (3d Dep't 1948) (injury to worker while rowing out to secure craft against
storm) ; Behrle v. London Guarantee & Acc. Co., 76 R.I. 106, 68 A.2d 63 (1949).
The twilight zone doctrine has effectively stemmed the tide of maritime-but-local litiga-
tion, for the rights of borderline claimants are now clear. If injured other than on navig-
able waters or a dry dock, the Longshoremen's Act is by its terms unavailable and the
state statute applies. § 903(a). If on navigable waters, and claimant obtains a federal
award, he may be reasonably certain of judicial affirmance on the Davis presumption and
the doctrine of administrative finality set out in South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett,
309 U.S. 251 (1940), discussed note 137 infra. See Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v.
Henderson, supra note 30; GILMORE & BLAcK 352-53. If, after injury on navigable waters,
claimant desires state remedy, the Davis presumption protects that choice also. See state
cases cited supra. Litigation is further reduced since state commissioners will respect
the presumption despite the absence of maritime-but-local precedent. See, e.g., Opinion
of the Chief Counsel, Legal Bureau, California Industrial Accident Comm'n, 15 Cal. Comp.
Cases 162, cited in 2 HANNA, EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
406 n.15 (1954), advising the Commission to assume jurisdiction whenever sought by
claimant. Cf. Skovgaard v. Tungus, 141 F. Supp. 653 (D.N.J. 1956).
32. GILaboRE & BLACK 354. See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953) (railroad brake-
man injured while aboard a car float); Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 281 U.S.
128 (1930) (railroad freight handler injured while loading a car float). See text at notes
77-82 infra.
34. See GILMORE & BLAcK 315-32, 352-53, 358-74; text at notes 105-147, 166-185
infra. On harborworkers recovering under'the unseaworthiness doctrine, see Tetreault,
Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harborworkers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381 (1954).
35. E.g., Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142 (1928) (longshoreman
barred from state compensation because performed occasional duties afloat and thus within




Regardless of the procedural formalities attending a state workmen's com-
pensation proceeding,36 federal tribunals universally allow qualified claimants
Longshoremen's Act recovery subsequent to a state award.37 This "recovery
over" equals the difference between compensation under the national act-nearly
always the larger amount 3 -- and that received under state law.3 9 The rationale
36. Most states operate under the "agreement" method, whereby employer and employee
concur on the amount of compensation due and state administrative officials merely verify
the submitted agreement to assure compliance with the statute; no hearings or investiga-
tions are conducted unless the claim is contested. In Michigan and Wisconsin, the employer
immediately begins payment on notice of injury and then files the claim; his continuing
payments are administratively supervised to insure adherence to the statute. In New
York, the "direct hearing" method is in force, but as a practical matter there is an actual
hearing only if the claim is contested; uncontested awards are administratively approved
by "motion hearing" of the claim submitted. In five states there is no compensation com-
mission, the statutes being court-administered with the parties making their own agree-
ments. Except for Wyoming, only perfunctory approval is given each such agreement,
and no judicial investigation or hearing occurs in the absence of contest. See SomFas
& Somans 148-56. For outlines of procedures and formalities in the various states, see
DODD 62-337; 2 LARSON §§ 82.30-.32.
37. See, e.g., Western Boat Bldg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F2d 409 (9th Cir. 1952)
(federal compensation not barred by prior state administrative award and acceptance of
payments); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. O'Hearne, 192 F.2d 968
(4th Cir. 1951) (federal compensation not barred by prior agreement to accept state
compensation payments) ; Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 149 F.2d 853
(5th Cir. 1945) (federal relief subsequent to voluntary payments and signed final settle-
ment receipt under state statute) ; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Brown, 47 F.2d 265
(N.D. Ill. 1930) (federal compensation allowed after state commissioner had made formal
award). For discussion, see GILMORE & BLAcK 354-55; 2 LARSEN §§ 89.40-.60; 66
HARV. L. REV. 524 (1953).
Because recovery over usually indicates indemnification, see note 175 infra and accom-
panying text, "recovery over" in quotation marks is used in this Comment to signify an
award obtained under the Longshoremen's Act subsequent to a formal state award or
receipt of voluntary payments under state law.
38. Under the Longshoremen's Act § 909, payments for death may be as high as 66%9
of deceased's average weekly wage, depending on the number of surviving dependents,
plus funeral expenses not exceeding $400. Payments of 66%% of the average wage are
always made during permanent or temporary total disability. §§ 908(a), (b). The maximum
rate for permanent partial disability is 66%% of the average weekly wage-period and
amount depending on the type and severity of injury. § 908(c).
Payments under state statutes are generally less in amount and duration. See DODD
41-52, 617-96; 2 HANNA, EmPLOYEE INJURIES A&ND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 426-36
(1954); 2 LARSON §§ 57.00-61,00, 64.00-.50, app. B; SomERs & SomERs 38-93. For a dia-
grammatic scheme comparing amounts recoverable under the federal and state statutes,
see Note, Jurisdiction of State and Federal Compensation Agencies Over Injuries Occur-
ring on Navigable lVaters, 53 YALE L.J. 348, 355 (1944).
There are only rare instances when state compensation exceeds federal, thus encourag-
ing federal-then-state "recovery over." No case reports state compensation sought after
a final federal award. In the absence of final award, acceptance of voluntary payments
under the Longshoremen's Act does not bar "recovery over" provided the period of ac-
ceptance has not been unconscionably long. See, e.g., Kaiser Co. v. Baskin, 340 U.S. 886
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of "recovery over," as fashioned in the lower federal courts, rests on a pre-
sumption of finality attaching to determination of jurisdictional issues by
United States compensation commissioners.40 Typically, a deputy commis-
sioner, having found that injury occurred on navigable waters and hence was
caused by a maritime tort, rules that state compensation was in derogation of
the uniformity doctrine. The commissioner then holds any prior state award
void and permits "recovery over," the ruling invariably being sustained on
appeal.41 Justifying this procedure, some commentators contend for federal
pre-emption. 42 Others, urging simply that jurisdictional doubts should be re-
solved to give fullest protection to injured employees, 43 find an analogy in cases
allowing "recovery over" from one state to another when both have an interest
in the worker's welfare.44 These advocates also see the federal award as needed
(1950) ; De Graw v. Todd Shipbuilding Corp., 23 N.J. Misc. 298, 43 A2d 879 (County Ct.
1945). But if voluntary payments were accepted over a long period of time in full settlement
under the Longshoremen's Act, subsequent state recovery is denied. Dunleavy v. Tietjen &
Lang Dry Docks, 17 N.J. Super. 76,85 A.2d 343 (County Ct. 1951), af'd, 20 N.J. Super. 486,
90 A.2d 84 (App. Div. 1952) (acceptance of federal payments over a period of six years
totalling $2,914).
39. When claimants "recover over" from one state compensation system to another or
from state to federal awards, double recovery is not permitted. Only the excess of the
subsequent award over payments previously received may be retained. Prior payments
are held to have been made in contemplation of liability under the second-chosen statute.
See RESTATE ENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 403 (1934); 2 LARSON § 85.70; cases cited note
37 supra.
40. Western Boat Bldg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409, 416 (9th Cir. 1952) (allowing
federal recovery subsequent to state award because fact findings of the federal agency,
where supported by the evidence, are made final); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. O'Hearne, 192 F.2d 968, 971 (4th Cir. 1951) (affirming the federal deputy
commissioner because "the case falls within the purview of the federal statute and outside
the permissible scope of the state enactment" and the state commission therefore had "no
jurisdiction in the premises"). The Supreme Court has never spoken on the validity of
"recovery over" from state to federal compensation.
The above decisions necessarily imply that claimant was outside of the Davis twilight
zone and that the Longshoremen's Act is thus available for subsequent recovery since the
state compensation proceeding, lacking jurisdiction over the subject matter, is no bar to
relitigation and is subject to collateral attack. Cf. Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res
Judicata in Administrative Law, 1942 Wis. L. Rxv. 5, 25. At least one commentator, how-
ever, believing allowance of federal "recovery over" by disaffirmance of the prior state
award to be "odd doctrine," would have "recovery over" rest on the theory that Davis
eliminated the mutually exclusive nature of the state and federal statutes, with both
remedies continuing to be available after award in one jurisdiction. Rodes, supra note 26,
at 648. But see 66 HAxv. L. REv. 524 (1953) ; notes 49-53 infra and accompanying text.
41. See cases cited note 37 stpra.
42. See, e.g., 2 LARSON § 89.52.
43. See, e.g., HoRovirz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAws 39 (1944) ; 2 LARSON § 85.60; cf., Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and
Credit Clanse, 44 CoLUM. L. REv. 330, 343-45 (1944) ; Wellen, Workmen's Compcnsation,
Conflict of Laws and the Constitutidn, 55 W. VA. L. REV. 233, 241 (1953).
44. 2 LARSON § 89.30; Wellen, supra note 43, at 237. For an outline of local interest




protection against employers initiating voluntary payments under the least
generous compensation statute or otherwise attempting to foreclose claimant's
choice of remedy. 45
Arguments for "recovery over" disregard basic statutory policy advancing
a contrary conclusion. Since congressional purpose in passing the Longshore-
men's Act was limited to providing relief for claimants denied state compen-
sation under the Supreme Court's uniformity doctrine, the act recognizes the
concern that each state may have for injured harborworkers. 46 Accordingly,
it leaves with the states the general power to compensate and makes federal
recovery contingent on the nonavailability of a valid local remedy.4 7 Federal
"recovery over" therefore defeats congressional intent by fostering annulment
of state awards. 48
"Recovery over" is also inconsistent with the Davis twilight zone doctrine.
Whenever a state agency grants an award and a deputy commissioner later
rules for federal coverage, this dispute of expert opinion necessarily indicates
45. The general rule is allowance of "recovery over" from one state to another. See,
generally, 1 HANNA, EMiPLOYEE I JURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 55-57 (1953);
2 LARSON §§ 85.10-.70; Dwan, Worknwn's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws-
The Restatement and Other Recent Developments, 20 MINN. L. Ray. 19 (1935) ; 60
HARV. L. REv. 993 (1947). The usual rules of conflict of laws do not apply to workmen's
compensation; questions of policy vital to the interests of each state are involved, so the
courts find each state empowered to apply its own law with no requirement to subordinate
domestic policy to another state's law. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 546 (1935). The full faith and credit clause does not "override
the constitutional authority of another state to legislate for the bodily safety and economic
protection of employees injured within it." Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acci-
dent Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 503 (1939).
Some cases bar "recovery over" on the ground that the first state statute specifically
precluded subsequent recovery elsewhere. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430
(1943) (oil field worker employed in Louisiana but injured in Texas denied higher
Louisiana compensation after obtaining formal Texas award) ; Gasch v. Britton, 202 F.2d
356 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; Holt, Reflections on Magnolia Petrdleum Co. v. Hunt, 30 CoRNELL
L.Q. 160 (1944) ; Note, 56 YALE L.J. 562 (1947). But if statutory language does not ex-
plicitly deny alternative recovery in another state, "recovery over" is allowed. Industrial
Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947) (resident of Illinois employed there but injured
in Wisconsin allowed "recovery over" in Wisconsin after Illinois award, the Illinois statute
[now ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 48, § 143 (Supp. 1957)] stating: "No common law or statutory
right to recover damages ... other than the compensation herein provided, shall be avail-
able to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this act . . . ."). Although an
apparent contradiction of Magnolia, McCartin did not directly overrule that case since the
holding rested on the less-stringent language of that statute and the fact that the first award
was not final because it recognized and approved a settlement of the parties which reserved
to the employee his rights in Wisconsin. See 330 U.S. at 627-30.
46. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
47. "Compensation shall be payable... in respect of disability or death of an employee,
but only if . . . recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation
proceedings may not validly be provided by State law." Longshoremen's Act § 903 (a).
48. To justify federal "recovery over," the district courts retrospectively disaffirm
the prior state awards, holding them void on Jensen uniformity grounds. See cases cited
note 37 supra.
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that claimant is within the twilight zone of jurisdictional uncertainty and that
free choice of remedy obtained at the outset.49 "Recovery over" therefore either
denies claimant his Davis free choice by retrospectively making the Longshore-
men's Act the only applicable statute, or else signifies that claimant's federal
rights persisted after the state conferred compensation. Initial existence of
alternative remedies does not, however, imply the continuing availability of
both once a choice is made. To the contrary, Davis, confirming the conclusive
weight due a twilight zone award, emphasized that the section of the act
rendering federal relief the sole remedy where applicable 10 gains meaning
"after a litigant has been found to occupy one side or the other of the doubtful
jurisdictional line .... ,51 A claimant who obtains a state award has manifestly
been found to occupy that side of the line. "Recovery over" ignores this de-
termination and eliminates the mutually exclusive nature of state law and
the Longshoremen's Act by according compensation under the latter after an
award under the former. "Recovery over" thus negates the "validly provided"
clause of the act,52 for a state award, valid under Davis, is federally super-
seded. Any other interpretation of "recovery over" must assume that Davis
suspends operation of the "validly provided" clause for judgments rendered
within the twilight zone.53 Since the Davis Court indicated just the opposite,
such a radical assumption appears unwarranted.
49. This degree of uncertainty over proper remedy is at least comparable to that
prevailing where "the most competent counsel" are unable to make a sure choice under
the maritime-but-local precedents. Davis v. Dep't of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 255 (1942). As
to the latter type of confusion prompting the Dazis twilight zone solution, see note 28
supra and accompanying text.
50. "The liability of an employer prescribed in [this act] ... shall be exclusive and in
place of all other liability of such employer to the employee .... ." Longshoremen's Act § 905.
51. 317 U.S. at 256.
52. Longshoremen's Act § 903(a), quoted note 47 supra.
53. Chief Justice Stone, in his Davis dissent, argued that if claimant has a free choice
then federal compensation is available, and that § 905, rendering the Longshoremen's
Act the exclusive remedy where applicable, must operate to bar state compensation. To
deny this effect to § 905, he stated, is not "within judicial competence," because § 905 is
congressionally designed to operate to the exclusion of all other remedies whenever
claimant may elect recovery under the Longshoremen's Act. 317 U.S. at 261.
To allow free choice, however, is not to negate § 905 since, when state compensation is
chosen, the opportunity for exclusive operation of the Longshoremen's Act does not arise.
The presumption favoring claimant's choice means that state compensation, if elected, was
"validly provided" under § 903(a), and that federal compensation was thereafter unavail-
able under the "validly provided" clause.
The view that Davis retained the mutually exclusive nature of the Longshoremen's
Act and state statutes so as to preclude "recovery over" has been described as "without
adequate support in the decisions or comments." Rodes, supra note 26, at 650. For a
contrary view, see Dunleavy v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Docks, 17 N.J. Super. 76, 85 A.2d
343 (County Ct. 1951), aff'd, 20 N.J. Super. 486, 90 A.2d 84 (App. Div. 1952), discussed
more fully note 60 infra. In this case (an attempted federal-then-state "recovery over"),
the court reasoned that once claimant made the choice of federal jurisdiction by accepting
payments over a period of time, the exclusive liability provision of the Longshoremen's Act
must take effect, for "we are not to suppose that the United States Supreme Court, in
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In addition to implications of the twilight zone doctrine and congressional
policy manifest in the Longshoremen's Act, the usual res judicata restriction
on repeated litigation militates strongly against "recovery over."54 Although
modified in the multistate "recovery over" situation because of coincident
local policies,r res judicata should be fully applicable in a state-federal context
since the Longshoremen's Act explicitly confines the federal interest to areas
in which local law may not be applied.56 Proscription of a second recovery
finds further support in decisions barring FELA suits on the ground that a
prior state award subsumes conclusive determination of a local cause of action. 7
developing for the perplexed claimant a free choice of a forum, intended to oppugn the
constitutional character of the act of Congress." 17 N.J. Super. at 88, 85 A.2d at 350. See
also 66 HARv. L. REv. 524, 524-25 (1953), concluding that "the claimant in a 'twilight
zone' case should be allowed to proceed in either forum; but once an award is made, the
implicit determination of jurisdiction should preclude a subsequent award in the other
forum." It has also been suggested that the defense of election may be raised when the
first jurisdiction has been confirmed by a final administrative award, but that mere
receipt of payments without award should not constitute a binding choice. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. O'Hearne, 192 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1951).
54. The usual meaning of res judicata is that the cause of action is merged in the
judgment to bar subsequent suit on the same cause of action. It may also mean, particu-
larly in the present context, collateral estoppel to bar retrial on issues finally decided in a
prior proceeding, where subsequent suit arising from the same injury but on a different
cause of action under a different statute is commenced. RESTATEmENT, JUDGMENTS 160-61
(1942). Thus, even if the second claim is held to rest on a different cause of action,
being brought under the federal statute, claimant might be barred from relitigating the
issue of whether remedy was validly provided by state law since that issue was previously
determined by the state commission. "Where a question of fact essential to the judgment
is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is
conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action .... .
Id. § 68. See also id. § 45. Although directed to the FELA plaintiff who has already ob-
tained compensation, the Restatement's approach to alternative remedies is equally per-
suasive here. "Where the plaintiff obtains judgment for the payment of money against
the defendant in an action to enforce one of two or more alternative remedies, he cannot
thereafter maintain an action to enforce another of the remedies." Id. § 64. Further,
"where a plaintiff has two possible remedies but they are mutually exclusive, that is to
say that if one of them is available the other is not, and he obtains a judgment giving him
one of the remedies, he is precluded from thereafter maintaining an action for the other
remedy." Id. § 64, comment g. On the res judicata effect of state administrative decisions
generally, see GELLHORN, ADINimSTRATrivE LAW C. IX (2d ed. 1947) ; PARKER, AnaxIms-
TRATIvE LAW 245-53 (1952) ; Davis, Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 25 TEXAS L.
Rzv. 199 (1947).
55. Note 45 supra and accompanying text.
56. Longshoremen's Act § 903 (a), quoted note 47 supra. One commentator apparently
favors application of res judicata theory to bar "recovery over" from state to federal
compensation following prior state judicial action but not following judicially uncon-
firmed administrative awards. Rodes, supra note 26, at 649.
57. For discussion of the extension of the state compensation-FELA precedents to bar
"recovery over" from state to Longshoremen's Act compensation, see 66 HARv. L. Rv.
524 (1953).
The FELA applies only to those railroad workers engaged in interstate commerce.
Wabash R.R. v. Hayes, 234 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1914). And, because the FELA pre-empts
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Thus, res judicata should preclude "recovery over" by a claimant who chooses
state compensation but later discovers larger benefits under the Longshore-
the field of relief for injured employees of interstate railroads, state compensation is un-
available even if negligence is not provable under FELA and plaintiff will go without
remedy. New York Cent. R.R. v. Porter, 249 U.S. 168 (1919); New York Cent. R.R. v.
Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917) ; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
A state compensation award therefore implies that claimant was employed in intrastate
commerce. For this reason, the award is res judicata on jurisdictional questions and
precludes subsequent FELA suit based on an interstate commerce theory. Chicago, R.I.
& Pac. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1926) ; Dennison v. Payne, 293 Fed. 333 (2d Cir.
1923). "[T]he rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined
by a competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi judicial acts of public
officers and boards as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers." Landreth
v. Wabash R.R., 153 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1946) ; see also HANNA, INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
COMMISSION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 119-20 (1943).
To constitute res judicata, the administrative award must be final and not subject to
judicial review under the statute or to continuing jurisdiction of the commission to reopen
the award. PARKER, op. cit. supra note 54, at 248-49. A temporary award is not res
judicata. Hinrichs v. Industrial Comm'n, 225 Wis. 195, 273 N.W. 545 (1937). The award
must satisfy the definition of a judgment. 2 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAwS 1390 (1935).
If claimant loses a state compensation claim, being designated an interstate railroad
employee, subsequent suit on an interstate theory should not be barred since it is a separate
cause of action and, "where the second suit is upon a different claim or demand, the prior
judgment operates as an estoppel only as to matters in issue or points controverted and
actually determined in the original suit." Troxell v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 227 U.S. 434,
440 (1913). The court noted, but did not decide, that if in a first suit "no action could have
been maintained under the state law, in view of the [FELA] ... , the fact that the plaintiff
attempted to recover under that law and pursued the supposed remedy until the court ad-
judged that it never had existed would not of itself preclude the subsequent pursuit of a
remedy for relief to which in law she is entitled." Id. at 442.
Compensation awards are res judicata not only as to subsequent FELA suits but also
later recovery under state employers' liability acts. French v. Rishell, 40 Cal. 2d 477, 254
P.2d 26 (1953) ; Kidder v. Marysville & A. Ry., 160 Wash. 471, 295 Pac. 162 (1931). State
administrative decisions are also res judicata in areas other than workmen's compensation.
See, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935) (state administrative action on stock-
holder assessment accorded finality under full faith and credit clause in sister state).
Some authority denies state administrative awards res judicata effect absent hearing
of evidence and an explicit holding by the state body on the jurisdictional question. Hoffman
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 74 F.2d 227, 230 (2d Cir. 1934) (the facts upon which juris-
diction depend "cannot, as in the case of courts of general jurisdiction, be inferred from
the mere exercise of jurisdiction"). In Hoffman, the commission's action was not an
award but approval of an agreement under the compensation statute. See also Dennison
v. Payne, supra; Bach v. Interurban Ry., 171 N.W. 723 (Iowa 1919). For an argument
favoring collateral attack on administrative awards when jurisdictional facts were not
litigated, see Schopflocher, supra note 40, at 29. But see Landreth v. Wabash R.R., sutpra
(barring FELA suit after state award). Landreth distinguished Hoffman, stating that no
proof on the jurisdictional question was offered there, while in Landreth evidence was
received and, although not included in the commision's specific holding, claimant was in-
ferentially found to be in intrastate commerce. 153 F.2d at 100. Hoffman may have been
overruled sub silentio by Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
(1940), 49 YALE L.J. 959 (even where jurisdictional issue not raised in state administra-
tive proceeding, not subject to collateral attack). But see Bretsky v. Lehigh Valley R.R.,
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men's Act.0 8 He has received the full protection of the twilight zone doctrine
-assurance of his first chosen remedy.59 His employer should now be able to
rely on the same doctrine to bar new claims in a different jurisdiction.60
On the other hand, "recovery over" may be desirable when claimant's
initial choice of remedy is impeded by, for example, ignorance of available
alternatives 61 or pressure from his employer to accept state compensation. 2
156 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1946) (compensation award subject to collateral attack if jurisdic-
tional issues were raised but commission refused to pass on them).
Some state compensation statutes explicitly bar subsequent suit for the same injury.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:15-58 (Supp. 1957) (award made by workmen's compen-
sation commission "shall have the same effect ... as judgments rendered in causes tried
in the court of common pleas .... The judgment shall be final and conclusive between
the parties and shall bar any subsequent action or proceeding .... " See Schopflocher,
supra note 40, at 200.
58. For discussion of the different levels of compensation under state and federal
statutes, see note 38 supra.
59. Davis v. Dep't of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942), discussed notes 24-27 supra and
accompanying text.
60. Employer uncertainty resulting from attempted "recovery over" is exemplified in
the facts of Dunleavy v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Docks, 17 N.J. Super. 76, 85 A.2d 343
(County Ct. 1951), aff'd, 20 N.J. Super. 486, 90 A.2d 84 (App. Div. 1952), discussed note
53 supra. Claimant originally filed under the state statute, but withdrew this claim in favor
of federal compensation. On termination of his incapacity, after six years of accepting volun-
tary payments under the Longshoremen's Act, he attempted "recovery over" to the state
-remedy, "for while the federal law provides compensation throughout the period of actual
incapacity for work, the state law would provide additionally an award for injury as
such, unaffected by actual capacity for work, both as to amount and duration of pay-
ments." 17 N.J. Super. at 91, 85 A.2d at 351. This, the court reasoned in denying the
second change of mind, "can fairly be thought of ... as bargaining and hindsight . .. ."
Id. at 94, 85 A.2d at 353. Hence, the court relied on the Davis presumption for claimant's
first choice, the "exclusive liability" provision of the Longshoremen's Act and a theory
of "vested jurisdiction" activated by acceptance of payments under one statute for a long
period, to bar the state claim. Id. passhn. Judge Drewen's lower court opinion contains
an exhaustive and perceptive analysis of Davis twilight zone history.
61. Some state commissions encourage injured workers with small claims to file
without advice of counsel on the ground that the purpose of the commission itself is to
look after claimants' interests. 2 LARsoN § 83.15. Discouragement of resort to counsel
may take the form of small counsel fees when the statute places fees directly under the
commission's supervision. Id. § 83.13. Formerly, legal fees were reduced in California
in order to preserve for claimant the bulk of his recovery. Allen, Fixing of Attorney's
Fees by the Industrial Accident Commission, 7 CALIF. S.B.J. 234 (1932). The current
approach is reportedly the opposite, and "claimants are not infrequently advised that the
natures of their cases are such that the retention of legal assistance would be wise." 1
HANNA, EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 324 (1953).
62. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). Claimant was
told by his employer that he could not collect any compensation if he did not sign the claim
form under the least onerous of the two state statutes available. Id. at 450. Under some
state systems, the employer may be able to initiate proceedings against claimant's wishes.
See Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1926) (railroad worker's
widow sought FELA damages but was barred by prior compensation award initiated by
employer in Iowa against her wishes, the Iowa statute allowing either party to petition
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In such cases, both the Longshoremen's Act and Davis furnish criteria for
permitting subsequent federal relief. To protect the worker from needless
surrender of potential claims, section 915 of the act invalidates waivers of em-
ployee rights.63 Moreover, Davis twilight zone doctrine assures a claimant not
the first jurisdiction chosen but the first jurisdiction of his choice.6 4 Conse-
quently, when the procedural circumstances attending state action render "re-
covery over" equitable, courts can override prior compensation by either
invoking section 915 or according claimant his free choice under Davis.
"Recovery over" would rarely be possible, however, following a con-
tested, litigated claim, if state awards are res judicata as to jurisdictional
questions. 6 But when claimant commences formal action, his voluntary
selection of state remedy may be virtually assumed.60 And in those
for arbitration of compensation claim); Overcash v. Yellow Transit Co., 352 Mo. 993,
180 S.W.2d 678 (1944) (claimant, learning during proceedings in Kansas of higher
award available in Missouri, barred from the higher recovery by employer petition for
final Kansas award). See also Landreth v. Wabash R.R., 153 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1946).
Although under most state systems no agreement is approved for less than the statutory
remedy, the great bulk of claims-particularly the smaller ones-are uncontested and
claimants may accept benefits short of the proper remedy. 2 LARSON § 82.00; Richter
& Forer, The Railroad Industry aitd Work-Incurred Disabilities, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 203,
244 (1951).
63. "No agreement by an employee to waive his right to compensation under this
chapter shall be valid." Longshoremen's Act § 915(b). This provision may mean both
that the employee may not contract away his compensation rights generally, and that in
addition he cannot, after a valid claim arises, agree to compromise for less than the statu-
tory amount. 2 LARSON § 82.32. However, there may be a valid accord and satisfaction
or release without waiver and, although parties cannot confer jurisdiction on state tri-
bunals by agreement, compromise agreements under state systems may be operative. See,
e.g., Heagney v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 190 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1951) (plaintiff
barred from FELA suit by prior agreement to accept state compensation even though he
might be in interstate commerce and otherwise eligible for FELA suit). But see Judge
Frank's dissent, arguing that since the FELA is a pre-emptive federal enactment and a
state compensation statute cannot validly be substituted for it where plaintiff is in inter-
state commerce, a waiver is invalid to confer state jurisdiction and the only real defense to
subsequent FELA suit is a full release or compromise. Id. at 980-85. No general prohi-
bition prevents claimants from entering into compromise agreements forsaking their tort
remedy under a federal statute by full releases. Gallen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332 U.S. 625
(1948) (release for $250 under state compensation statute bars later FELA suit although
at time made parties did not know severity of the injury). But there is room for judicial
flexibility, and a prior agreement may be held not binding if claimant was ignorant of his
rights. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 149 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1945) (though
claimant had received $355 in voluntary payments under Florida statute for which he signed
a "receipt in full settlement," subsequent federal award allowed) ; see Newport News Ship-
building & Drydock Co. v. O'Hearne, 192 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1941) (similar).
64. Davis v. Dep't of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942), discussed notes 24-27 supra and
accompanying text.
65. See notes 54, 57 supra and accompanying text.
66. A survey in 1951 of state compensation commissions throughout the country
found that they "generally have come to frown upon an employee's appearing without
counsel, or a layman's attempting to practice before them." Bear, Survey of the Legal
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occasional cases in which the employer begins local compensation pro-
ceedings, 7 "recovery over" can be sanctioned, if fairness requires, on the
ground that a state remedy is not "validly provided" when it violates federal
free choice policy.68
THE AMPHIBIOUS RAILWAYMAN
Most interstate railroad workers who are negligently injured in the course
of employment have an FELA cause of action in tort against their employers. 69
The few authentic seamen working for railroads-such as ferry and barge
crew members-may seek damages under'the Jones Act and the unseaworthi-
ness doctrine.70 Between these two groups are a number of land-based railway
employees who occasionally work afloat 71 and for whom interaction of remedies
is of peculiar significance because an employer, defending an FELA suit for
Profession-Workmen's Compensation and the Lawyer, 51 CoLual. L. REV. 965, 969 (1951).
"Today, more and better legal talent is available to claimants because the volume of
compensation litigation has increased to the point where lawyers can afford to specialize
on the claimant's side and because courts and commissions have become more liberal in
allowing attorney's fees." Som.ERs & SomERs 181. Witness the growth, since its inception
in 1946, of the National Association of Compensation Claimants' Attorneys (NACCA),
and its regular publication, the NACCA Law Journal. Specifically, although in Illinois
the agreement system prevails by statute, see note 36 supra, representation is not limited
to contested cases, and in a survey of the state commissioners "testimony to the high rate
of attorney representation was unanimous, with no estimate lower than 90 per cent in non-
fatal cases, and one commissioner estimating 98 per cent." CONARD & MEHR, COST OF AD-
MINISTERING REPARATION OF WORK INJUIES IN ILLINOIS 39 (Univ. of Ill. mimeo release
1952), cited in SoatERs & SomEs 156 n.23, 182 n.83.
67. See note 62 supra.
68. On development of the policy that the Longshoremen's Act allows claimant a
free choice between state and federal compensation, see notes 25-31 supra and accompany-
ing text. A state award granted at employer's instance and over claimant's objections
could be read as derogation from that policy, and "recovery over" allowed on grounds
state compensation was not "validly provided" under Dazis. By its terms, the Longshore-
men's Act is applicable where state compensation may not be "validly provided." Long-
shoremen's Act § 903(a), quoted note 47 supra.
69. Relevant provisions of FELA are set forth in note 5 supra. Railroad workers not
engaged in interstate commerce are covered either by state workmen's compensation
statutes or, in twenty-one states, by state employers' liability statutes patterned after
the federal act. Pollack, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Work Injuries and
Diseases, 36 CORNE LL L.Q. 236, 259 (1951). State compensation is never available for
the interstate railroad worker since the FELA pre-empts the field of injuries to such
workers. See cases cited note 57 supra.
70. See, e.g., Butwinski v. Pennsylvania R.R., 249 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1957) (floatman
injured aboard railroad company tugboat eligible for Jones Act damages as a crew
member) ; Weiss v. Central R.R., 235 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956) (Jones Act recovery for
railroad ferry deckhand). For an outline of workers eligible for unseaworthiness damages,
see note 167 infra and accompanying text. The seaman employed by a railroad may also
be eligible for maintenance and ctire. See cases cited note 151 infra.
71. These employees are ordinary railroad workers (not longshoremen employed by
the railroad) who happen to be engaged in port activities such as loading trains on car
barges. For cases involving this group of employees, see notes 77-78, 80 infra.
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injury on navigable waters, can successfully argue the exclusive applicability
of the Longshoremen's Act.72 Although the plaintiff thus barred from FELA
recovery is statutorily assured of subsequent Longshoremen's Act compen-
sation,73 he loses the easily attainable and usually far greater tort recovery. 74
Absent a Longshoremen's Act defense, qualification as an interstate railroad
employee is not difficult;75 and a nominal showing of employer negligence
ordinarily produces an award of damages since FELA plaintiffs enjoy special
judicial favor in taking their cases to the jury.76
72. These statutes are mutually exclusive because § 905 of the Longshoremen's Act
renders compensation the exclusive liability of employers where that act applies, thus
making FELA unavailable. See note 50 supra. Because these employees when injured
are said to be engaged in "maritime employment" on "navigable waters," their employer
is held eligible to claim the exclusive liability of the Longshoremen's Act §§ 902(4),
903(a). See cases cited notes 77, 79 infra and accompanying text. For text of § 902(4),
see note 80 infra; for § 903 (a), see note 47 supra.
73. Under the Longshoremen's Act, the prior claim tolls the statute of limitations.
"Where recovery is denied to any person, in a suit brought at law or in admiralty to recover
damages in respect of injury or death ... the limitation of time [under this act] ... shall
begin to run only from the date of termination of such suit." Longshoremen's Act § 913(d).
This provision applies to an FELA suit. Hoage v. Terminal Refrigerating & Warehousing
Co., 78 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1935). But it does not extend to proceedings under a state
compensation statute, such a claim not being a "suit brought at law." Dawson v. Jahncke
Drydock, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 668 (E.D. La. 1940); Ayers v. Parker, 15 F. Supp. 447 (D.
Md. 1936). See note 23 supra.
74. Longshoremen's Act recoveries are restricted to a percentage of wages or to fixed
disablement sums. See note 38 supra. jury verdicts are not so restricted and include
damages for pain and suffering and other tortious items. The average jury verdict for
FELA plaintiffs has increased significantly in recent years. For a comparison of the
overall increase in FELA recoveries with the increase in railway payrolls from 1940-51,
see Pollack, The Crisis in Work Injury Compensation On and Off the Railroads, 18
LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 296, 315 (1953). In some cases of permanent total disability,
however, even a large FELA recovery will amount to less if prorated on a monthly basis
over the remainder of plaintiff's life than will certain state compensation awards. Pollack,
Workmen!'s Compensation for Railroad Work Injuries and Diseases, 36 CoRNEL L.Q. 236,
252-55 (1951).
75. Under the expansive scope of FELA, as amended in 1939, only the rare railroad
employee cannot demonstrate that "any part" of his duties are in "furtherance of" inter-
state commerce, or that they "in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such
commerce'-the jurisdictional requirement set out in the statute. 53 STAT. 1404 (1939),
45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952). For discussion of the purpose of the amendment, and its scope, see
note 5 supra.
76. Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (allegation of employer's negligence
held sufficient to go to jury on question whether leaving clinker of coal on railroad where
plaintiff tripped and injured himself was actionable negligence). See also Rogers v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) ; McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19 (1954)
Stone v. New York, C. & St. L. Ry., 344 U.S. 407 (1953).
The Supreme Court has shown increased willingness to grant certiorari to review
fact determinations of trial judges adverse to plaintiffs. Comment, Su1preme Court Cer-
tiorari Policy and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 451, 463-64
(1958). The practice of granting certiorari absent a state court decision on a federal
[Vol. 67:12051224
INJURED HARBORWORKERS
Railroad workers hurt on navigable waters have not enjoyed FELA ad-
vantages since the 1930 decision of Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.7 7
There, the FELA plaintiff was a railroad freight handler injured while loading
a car aboard a float; the Supreme Court deduced that he was engaged in
maritime employment and therefore within the exclusive coverage of the Long-
shoremen's Act.78 Extending Noqueira in 1953, the Court in Pennsylvania
R.R. v. O'Rourke 79 denied a railroad brakeman FELA suit because even his
temporary presence on navigable waters invested him with status as a mari-
time employee.80 Place of injury thus became the sole determinant of the
question in conflict with Supreme Court precedent or a conflict among the circuits has
been sharply criticized. See, e.g., RoBERTsols & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 662-65, 740-43 (2d ed. 1951); Gibbs, Certiorari: Its
Diagnosis and Cure, 6 HASTINGs L.J. 131, 152 n.127, 156 (1955). But see Tonahill, Com-
vients on Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 3 NACCA L.J. 194, 195-96 (1949) (supporting the
Court's policy).
Alleged judicial solicitude for plaintiffs has prompted many Supreme Court dissents
contending that the FELA has been made to impose liability without fault. See, e.g.,
McAllister v. United States, supra at 23-24 (dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfur-
ter) ; Stone v. New York, C. & St. L. Ry., supra at 411 (same). See also Bailey v. Central
Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354-53 (1943) (dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts, arguing
that the fact that the trial court took the case from the jury is no reason to grant certiorari
"where a plaintiff failed to adduce proof to support his contention") ; cases cited note 135
infra.
77. 281 U.S. 128 (1930).
78. Id. at 131. Nogneira has been followed on similar facts in Merritt-Chapman
& Scott Corp. v. Willard, 189 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1951); Win. Spencer & Son Corp. v.
Lowe, 152 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1945); Buren v. Southern Pac. R.R., 50 F.2d 407 (9th
Cir. 1931) ; Scrinko v. Reading Co., 117 F. Supp. 603 (D.N.J. 1954) ; Rist v. Conneaut
Dock Co., 104 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Job v. Erie R.R., 79 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.
N.Y. 1948) ; Gussie v. Pennsylvania R.R., 1. N.J. Super. 293, 64 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1949).
79. 344 U.S. 334 (1953).
80. Plaintiff, at the instant of injury, was operating a handbrake on a railroad car being
removed from a car float. Id. at 340. The Second Circuit had upheld plaintiff's choice
of FELA remedy, reasoning that the Longshoremen's Act is applicable only if the
injury occurs on navigable waters and the general nature of plaintiff's duties is maritime.
O'Rourke v. Pennsylvania R.R., 194 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1952). In reversing, the
Supreme Court seemed to reason either that the Longshoremen's Act applies exclusively
if the injury was on navigable waters and the employer has any employees engaged in
maritime employment (even though plaintiff is not one of them) ; or, alternatively, that
because a car float is a vessel on navigable waters its operations are maritime and plaintiff's
on-board injury renders him a maritime employee. 344 U.S. at 338.
The first line of reasoning relies on the following provisions of the Longshoremen's
Act § 904(a) : "Every employer shall be liable for and shall secure the payment to his
employees of the compensation payable under [this act] ... .", and § 902(4) : "The term
'employer' means an employer any of whose employees are engaged in maritime employ-
ment .... " 344 U.S. at 338. In the context of the statute, however, the cited sections clearly
are not designed to foreclose noncompensation remedies for all nonmaritime employees of
employers who may have some employees "engaged in maritime employment." Rather,
these provisions operate to bring all such employers within the act, imposing upon them
the obligation to "secure the payment" of compensation for those employees who are
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applicable statute however nonmaritime the nature of plaintiff's duties.8 ' Con-
sequently, no twilight zone free choice exists between FELA and Longshore-
men's Act, the proper remedy being a matter of court-found law. Nor has the
Supreme Court adopted a modified twilight zone approach under which the
jurisdictional issue of plaintiff's general duties would be determined by a jury.8 2
Delimiting FELA and the Longshoremen's Act by the navigable-waters test
alone, the Court has achieved simplicity along an unclear borderline, but only
by imposing an arbitrary standard which denies the customary remedy of genu-
inely nonmaritime employees. Under the Court's rule, any railroad worker-
brakeman, conductor, engineer-loses his FELA suit simply by boarding a car
barge.8 3 This result is inconsistent with the intent of Congress and the statutory
language. FELA was passed to pre-empt state legislation in the field of em-
ployer liability by providing the exclusive remedy for injured interstate railroad
workers.8 4 The Longshoremen's Act, by way of contrast, is a saving statute,
complementary in nature, with coverage dependent upon the reach of local legis-
lation.8 5 These disparate legislative purposes hardly suggest pre-eminence of
the Longshoremen's Act as against prior legislation under the interstate com-
merce power.8 6 In fact, a contrary conclusion is indicated by inclusion of injuries
occuring on "boats" under FELA coverage and by congressional retention of
that provision after careful re-evaluation of the statute's jurisdictional scope.87
eligible under the act; but, if the employer fails to do so, eligible maritime employees
may sue for tort damages under § 905.
The Court's alternative reasoning, "that the emphasis on the nature of claimant's duties
here misses the mark," clearly supplants the test of employment category by a strict
"place of injury" rule, despite ostensible effort by the Court to bring plaintiff within the
"maritime employment" category. See id. at 339.
81. See Gimoa E & BLACK 357.
82. In O'Rourke, the Supreme Court not only overruled a jury verdict but strongly
implied that the statutory line of demarcation should be drawn by the courts. See note
101 infra.
83. The illogic of applying the Longshoremen's Act to bar FELA suit for a railroad
brakeman because his train happens to be on a car float at the time of injury was pointed
out by the O'Rourke dissenters. 344 U.S. at 342. The place of injury test suggested to
them that making what would be railroading "maritime" solely because of location would
equally demand exclusive Longshoremen's Act coverage of a train crew crossing a bridge
with its supports in a navigable stream. Id. at 343.
84. See cases cited note 57 supra.
85. See notes 11-18 supra and accompanying text.
86. The FELA was originally enacted in 1908. The Longshoremen's Act was passed
in 1927. See notes 5, 7 supra.
87. The FELA covers employees of interstate railroad carriers injured "by reason of
any defect or insufficiency, due to [the carrier's] ... negligence, in its cars, engines, appli-
ances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment." FELA § 51.
For discussion of the 1939 amendment expanding the scope of FELA, see note 5 supra. It
has been suggested that failure to delete the "boats" and "wharves" provisions during
Congress' careful section-by-section examination of the FEI.A in 1939, reviewing the
coverage of that statute, should be conclusive enough to overrule the case of Nogueira
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 281 U.S. 128 (1930). Richter & Forer, Federal Employers'
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Requiring Longshoremen's Act rather than FELA awards through judicial
application of the O'Rourke place-of-injury test revives doctrine resembling
that of Crowell v. Benson,"8 under which appellate courts find de novo all facts
determinative of statutory applicability.8 9 This extension of the much maligned 90
Crowell rationale into FELA suits, while probably unintended, nonetheless
runs counter to decisional law since 1932 91 and is specifically incompatible
with the Court's current disposition of jurisdictional issues under the Jones
Act.0 2 Having recently enunciated a basic policy of affirming the fact-finder's
determinations if based on "substantial evidence," 93 the Supreme Court now
reverses trial court direction of verdicts against Jones Act plaintiffs and re-
mands for jury resolution of their jurisdictional status.94 Moreover, the Court
has not looked behind jury verdicts finding borderline plaintiffs to have been
crew members, and thus eligible for Jones Act tort damages rather than Long-
shoremen's Act compensation.9 5 This policy, clearly undercutting Crowell,
suggests that O'Rourke might be overruled by the present Court. And since
Liability Act, in 12 F.R.D. 13, 27 (1951). This argument was adopted in Zientek v. Reading
Co., 93 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Pa. 1950), but specifically rejected in the O'Rourke case.
344 U.S. at 341 n.6.
88. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
89. The issue in Crowell was the scope of judicial review of an award under the
Longshoremen's Act. The act provides that the deputy commissioner "shall have full
power and authority to hear and determine all questions in respect of [any] . . . claim,"
§ 919(a), and that the district court can set aside an order only if "not in accordance
with law," § 921 (b). The Court recognized that, "as to questions of fact.., the findings
of the deputy commissioner, supported by evidence and within the scope of his authority,
shall be final." 285 U.S. at 46. But the Court held that where the determination of fact is
"fundamental" or "jurisdictional," it is subject to judicial review by trial de novo.
Otherwise, the Court reasoned, the deputy commissioner would be deciding questions the
resolution of which determine whether or not he had jurisdiction under the act. Id.
at 54-55. The decision affirmed the district court's review by trial de novo of the two
"jurisdictional facts"-whether the injury occurred on navigable waters and whether
claimant was an employee of defendant at time'of injury. The decision purportedly rested
on the need to insure independence of the judiciary in resolving constitutional matters as
against congressional establishment of administrative tribunals. Id. at 64.
The case has been largely restricted to its holding which in turn has been substantially
eroded by subequent decisions; today, the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine is practically never
applied to decisions of either juries or administrative bodies. See GILMoPE & BLAcK 340-
42; Landis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1077, 1093 (1940) ;
Schwartz, Does the Ghost of Crowell v. Benson Still Walk?, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 163 (1949).
90. See authorities cited note 89 supra.
91. See GImop & BLACK 340-42; Schwartz, supra note 89 (collecting cases).
92. See cases cited notes 124-35 infra and accompanying text.
93. The leading case on the "substantial evidence" rule is South Chicago Coal & Dock
Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940). For description of Bassett and the rule, see note 137
infra. For recent Supreme Court revival of the rule in Jones Act cases, see notes 124-34
infra and accompanying text.
94. Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U.S. 252 (1958); Butler v. Whiteman,
356 U.S. 271. (1958), discussed notes 130-34 infra and accompanying text.
95. Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957); Gianfala v. Texas Co.,
350 U.S. 879 (1955), discussed notes 124-29 infra and accompanying text.
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the FELA, like the Jones Act, defines its scope in terms of employment cate-
gory-employee of interstate railroad 96 and seaman 9 -- reversing O'Rozrke
would end jurisdictional incongruities in current law by letting the reach of
both statutes depend on application of the nature-of-duties test.08
Correction of O'Rourke discrimination against nonmaritime workers injured
afloat can be achieved short of creating a Davis-type twilight zone between
FELA and the Longshoremen's Act. In fact, the Davis free-choice solution, de-
signed to prevent total loss of remedy, is inapposite since the Longshoremen's
Act tolls the statute of limitations during suit under other federal enactments
and an employee deprived of FEILA protection can therefore still recover federal
compensation.99 Furthermore, allowing employees to choose between funda-
mentally different remedies would defeat the congressional design of restricting
longshoremen to workmen's compensation 100 while granting ordinary railroad
employees a tort recovery conditioned on proof of negligence. 1 1
96. FELA § 51 covers "Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties ... shall
be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce . . . ." See note 5 supra.
97. The Jones Act applies to "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment." 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
98. In deciding whether the Jones Act or the Longshoremen's Act is applicable, situs
of injury is of no moment, the usual and ordinary duties of plaintiff determining his status
as seaman and crew member. At one time the Jones Act was held to provide no remedy for
seamen injured shoreside on the theory that they were beyond the scope of federal admi-
ralty jurisdiction. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 104 F.2d 148, 149 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 555 (1939) (seaman injured on pier in course of employment
denied Jones Act suit and relegated to state compensation for remedy) ; Esteves v. Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co., 74 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1934) (similar). For earlier Supreme Court dictum
supporting this theory, see note 17 supra. In 1943, the Supreme Court declared the Jones
Act available for injury ashore, stating that place of injury has no relevance so long as
plaintiff was a seaman and was injured in the course of employment. O'Donnell v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 39, 42 (1943) (deckhand of vessel injured ashore) ;
accord, McKie v. Diamond Marine Co., 204 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Marceau v. Great
Lakes Transit Corp., 146 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 872 (1945).
99. Longshoremen's Act § 913(d), quoted note 73 supra. The main reason impelling the
twilight zone solution in the Davis context was to foreclose hardship for claimants, unsuc-
cessful on their first suit, who were barred by the statute of limitations from the alternative
remedy. See notes 23, 26 supra and accompanying text.
Railroad employees, if not crew members under the Jones Act, may be compensated
under the Longshoremen's Act where they have maritime duties and are injured on navig-
able waters. See, e.g., Lowe v. Central R.R., 113 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1940) (railroad car
float watchman) ; Pere Marquette Ry. v. Bassett, 42 F. Supp. 781 (D. Mich. 1941) (simi-
lar) ; Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Parker, 4 F. Supp. 815 (D. Md. 1933) (barge hand assigned
to supervising loading of cargo from barge to steamships).
100. Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946), discussed notes 119-20 infra and
accompanying text.
101. In O'Rourke, the Court mentioned Davis, but did not adopt a solution of free
jurisdictional choice or even acknowledge statutory overlap, since "we have two federal
statutes and a line marking their coverage can be drawn." 344 U.S. at 341 n.8.
The position against absolute free choice between disparate tort and compensation
remedies is adopted by GILmOlE & BLAcx 357-58; 2 LARs N §§ 90.31, 90.41. For arguments
in favor of extending the, Davis "free-choice" doctrine to allow an option between tort
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A solution consistent with legislative policy in both FELA and the Long-
shoremen's Act would be a return to the test which Nogueira purportedly relied
upon-statutory delimitation as a matter of fact based on the general nature
of claimant's employment duties. 10 2 Under this solution, a Longshoremen's
Act defense to FELA suit would fail if the jury found that plaintiff was
principally engaged in railroad rather than maritime work. Of course, a jury
might attempt to extend tort relief to employees clearly within the Longshore-
men's Act-for example, those doing ordinary stevedoring work for a rail-
road.10 3 But such unjustified findings could be judicially overturned as failing
to meet the standards of the "substantial evidence" rule.1°4
THE ELUSIVE "CREw 4EMBER"
Demarcation between the Jones and Longshoremen's Acts 1o1 is inexact, 0 6
thus encouraging injured workers of ambiguous status to shift across this
statutory borderline as opportunity may dictate.'0 7 The Jones Act provides
and compensation remedies, see Richter & Forer, Federal Employers' Liability Act, in 12
F.R.D. 13, 26-27 (1951) ; 8 NACCA L.J. 154-55 (1951) ; 10 NACCA L.J. 148-49 (1952) ;
19 NACCA L.J. 116-17 (1957). For a novel suggestion to grant a dual tort-compensation
remedy, the tort damages to be available when injury results from "some human failure
to pay due regard to the employee's safety," and the compensation award to be available
when "injury results from some risk normally incidental to the employment pursued,"
see Gardner, Remedies for Personal Injuries to Seamen, Railroadinen, and Longshoremen,
71 HARV. L. REv. 438, 463-64 (1958).
102. In Nogueira, the Court reasoned that although plaintiff, a freight handler only
temporarily aboard a car barge, was injured on navigable waters in the course of his
normal work, he was a maritime employee under the Longshoremen's Act. 281 U.S. at
128, 130.
103. Longshoremen are within the exclusive scope of the Longshoremen's Act when
injured on navigable waters and therefore may not bring tort actions against their
employers. Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946). See notes 118-20 infra
and accompanying text. This prohibition also applies to other conventional harborworkers,
such as ship repairmen. See, e.g., Rist v. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 104 F. Supp.
29 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (repairman injured aboard ship barred from FELA suit by Long-
shoremen's Act eligibility).
104. See notes 93 supra, 137 infra and accompanying text. Despite recent Supreme
Court reluctance to overturn jury findings on the jurisdictional issue, see text at notes
124-136 infra, federal courts still reverse if a finding was not based on substantial evidence.
See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Savoie, 240 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1957) (overruling jury crew mem-
ber finding for Jones Act plaintiff who was oil company roustabout because "there is -no
substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that he was a member of the crew").
See also cases cited note 137 infra.
105. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952) (Jones Act), quoted note 6 supra;
44 STAT. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1952) (Longshoremen's Act),
outlined note 7 supra.
106. See cases cited notes 123-34 infra and accompanying text.
107. When actionable negligence is not provable, the borderline seaman who would
ordinarily qualify for the Jones Act may attempt to claim under the Longshoremen's Act
since negligence is not essential to recovery. See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Alaska
Industrial Bd., 88 F. Supp. 172 (D. Alaska 1950) (reversal of federal compensation for
1958] 1229
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
"'any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of employment" with
a tort remedy against his negligent employer. 08 A seaman, however, may be
indistinguishable from certain maritime employees covered by the Longshore-
men's Act.'0 9 Hence, persons fitting both descriptions pursue tort recovery
when negligence is provable and compensation otherwise. 110 In practice, statu-
tory delineation is attempted through the negative implications of the Long-
shoremen's Act clause excepting "a master or member of a crew of any vessel"
from federal compensation coverage. 11 Implementing this restriction, courts
require plaintiff to qualify as a crew member in order to sue under the Jones
Act even if the situs of the accident renders federal compensation unavailable."12
deckhand of cannery towboat). But when negligence can be shown, harborworkers may
attempt to sue under the Jones Act to recover tort damages. See, e.g., Swanson v. Marra
Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946) (Jones Act suit denied longshoreman injured on dock).
See also cases discussed notes 118-34 infra and accompanying text.
108. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952). The Jones Act does not specify
that the action must be solely against the employer. There is no clear holding on the point,
but no Jones Act suit has ever been decided against a nonemployer. A general agent
in charge of the ship is not liable. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783
(1949) ; cf. Turner v. Wilson Line, 242 F.2d 414, 417 (1st Cir. 1957) ; Arnold v. Lucken-
bach S.S. Co., 1958 Am. Mar. Cas. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Because the Jones Act injury
must be in the "course of employment," the action, by implication, may be brought only
against the employer. See GILmORE & BLACK 285-86 (collecting cases).
109. See facts of cases cited notes 112, 118, 126 infra.
110. For examples of borderline harborworker-seamen pursuing Jones Act tort
recovery in the presence of actionable negligence, see Hagens v. United Fruit Co., 135
F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1943) (deck hand, employed aboard hoister engaged in removing pilings
from river, held to be Jones Act crew member) ; Early v. American Dredging Co., 101
F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (deck hand on dredge held Jones Act crew member even
though not under seaman's articles and lived at home) ; Mamat v. United Fruit Co., 39 F.
Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (seaman, discharged as member of crew and hired to work
with shore gang, denied Jones Act recovery since not engaged in seaman's work) ; cases
discussed in text at notes 119-34 infra.
For examples of borderline workers seeking federal compensation in the absence of
provable negligence, see Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Pillsbury, 130 F.2d 21 (9th Cir.
1942) (deck hand aboard vessel who had duties of loading and storing cargo held eligible
for compensation as non-crew-member) ; Blaske v. Bassett, 35 F. Supp. 315 (D. Mo. 1940)
(laborer with duties of loading ship, held compensable under Longshoremen's Act as non-
crew-member) ; cases cited note 137 infra.
111. "No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of-(1)
A master or member of a crew of any vessel . . . ." Longshoremen's Act § 903 (a).
112. Compare Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946) (longshoreman in-
jured on dock outside scope of Jones Act because not a crew member), with Senko v.
LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957) (crew member status accorded Jones Act
plaintiff injured on land and hence unable to obtain federal compensation). The Jones Act
is not limited to injuries on navigable waters but creates a tort action for any seaman-
crew member wherever injured in the course of employment. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943). The seaman may recover if injured on land
while returning to the vessel from shore leave, the prospective duties on return being
sufficient to bring him within the course of employment. Marceau v. Great Lakes Transit
Corp., 146 F.2d 416, 418 (2d Cir. 1945). For an earlier view that admiralty jurisdiction
did not extend beyond navigable waters and limiting the Jones Act accordingly, see cases
cited notes 17, 98 supra.
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Conversely, a claimant seeking compensation must positively establish his non-
crew-member status."13
Like the FELA, the Jones Act is more attractive than the Longshoremen's
Act when negligence is demonstrable because of the relatively large tort measure
of recovery.114 The requisite quantum of negligence is even smaller than under
FELA since seamen are judicially recognized as dependent upon a paternal-
istic shipowner who owes them a duty beyond that imposed by the common-law
standard of due diligence.'n 5 At one time-after Jensen and before the Long-
shoremen's Act-Jones Act damages were available to longshoremen and other
harborworkers unable to receive state compensation because of the uniformity
doctrine."" But, the Longshoremen's Act having since been read as restricting
non-crew-member employees to compensation,"17 such plaintiffs can now obtain
Jones Act damages only if the courts grant free election of remedy or respect
favorable jury resolution of the crew-member issue.
Until recently, courts consistently vacated Jones Act awards to most long-
shoremen and conventional harborworkers by ruling such plaintiffs not crew
members as a matter of "law."" 8 In 1946, the Supreme Court said in Swanson
113. See, e.g., Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944) (caretaker of barge who
lived aboard the vessel denied federal compensation because a crew member).
114. See note 74 supra.
115. The recent Supreme Court cases reducing the required FELA degree of negli-
gence below the common-law level are described in notes 76 supra and 135 infra.
Typical of the judicial attitude towards Jones Act negligence are statements by Justice
Cardozo that seamen are "wards of the admiralty"; that, because of their dependence on
employer's care while isolated aboard ship on sea duty, he has an "obligation of fostering
protection." Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 (1932). Plaintiff's burden
of proving proximate cause of his negligence case is "reduced to a featherweight" by the
Court's liberal interpretation of res ipsa loquitur. See GIL ORE & BLACK 308-15 (collect-
ing cases) ; cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 48, 49 (1948). Moreover, the com-
mon-law defenses of fellow-servant, contributory negligence and assumption of risk are
barred, since the Jones Act incorporates the FELA by reference. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920),
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952). Abolition of these defenses is accomplished by FELA §§ 51-54.
116. See, e.g., International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926) (long-
shoreman injured aboard ship). Prior to the Longshoremen's Act, the Jones Act was often
the only remedy available to longshoremen injured aboard ship. They were barred from
common-law tort suit by fellow-servant, contributory negligence and assumption of risk
doctrines and were ineligible for state compensation since no maritime-but-local case
had yet so modified Jesen. See maritime-but-local cases cited notes 21-22 supra. The
resulting strained application of the "seaman" label to longshoremen, designed to avoid
leaving them remediless, was a principal reason impelling passage of the Longshoremen's
Act. See GnmoRE & BLAcx 360-61.
117. Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946), discussed notes 119-20 infra
and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., supra note 117 (longshoreman injured
on pier while loading vessel); Lugo v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 86 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.
N.Y. 1949) (painter injured aboard ship) ; Armento v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 198
(E.D.N.Y. 1947) (repairman injured aboard ship) ; see also Frankel v. Bethlehem-Fair-
field Shipyard, Inc., 132 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1942) (construction worker injured while
working on uncompleted vessel). Contra, Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991,
994-95 (1st Cir. 1941).
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v. Marra Bros., Inc."19 that tort recovery is available only to "members of the
crew of a vessel plying in navigable waters," and upheld dismissal of a long-
shoreman's complaint. 1 20  The Court's 1953 decision in Desper v'. Starved
Rock Ferry Co.1 2 1 reaffirmed the rule that the crew member question is one of
"law" and not "fact." There, plaintiff, though injured while repairing craft laid
up for the winter, had been a seaman during the summer and was a "probable
navigator in the near future." The Court held that duties at the time of injury
determined status and that his work of painting and repairing vessels which
he would soon navigate was not that "usually done by a seaman." Thus,
Swanson and Desper-much in the manner of O'Rourke's delimitation of
FELA and the Longshoremen's Act 122 -foreclose any twilight zone juris-
dictional election by preventing juries from including conventional harbor-
workers and longshoremen within the crew-member category.
Sharp contrast is provided by recent Supreme Court deferrence to jury de-
termination of the crew-member question in cases involving workers who per-
119. 328 U.S. 1 (1946).
120. Id. at 7.
The Court reasoned that applicability of the Jones Act depends on the nature of plain-
tiff's duties and status rendering him an actual seaman; that the Longshoremen's Act
reflects congressional intent to grant federal compensation exclusively to all harborworkers,
not crew members; that prior affirmances of Jones Act damages for longshoremen were
directly overruled by the Longshoremen's Act since it restricts Jones Act scope to crew
members; but since the injury occurred on land (a dock) the Longshoremen's Act is
inapplicable, and plaintiff's remedy is state compensation (which he had already obtained).
Prior to Swanson, the last Supreme Court allowance of Jones Act suit for a longshore-
man employed by a stevedoring company had been Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234
(1931), in which the Court relied on International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S.
50 (1926), to reverse dismissal of the complaint. 282 U.S. at 238-39. The opinion con-
tained no reference to possible applicability of the Longshoremen's Act. For a case antici-
pating the reasoning of Swantron, see Frankel v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 132
F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1942) (shipyard worker, injured while installing dynamo in engine
room of vessel, denied Jones Act suit).
Theoretically, at least, a longshoreman injured more than three miles from shore
could be eligible for Jones Act suit, since the Longshoremen's Act is applicable only
to injuries occurring on the "navigable waters of the United States." § 903(a). See
Pillsbury, Jurisdiction Over Injuries to Maritime Workers, 18 VA. L. Rv. 740, 757,
763 (1932). But if the Swanson case applied the crew member requirement of the Long-
shoremen's Act to bar Jones Act suit where the Longshoremen's Act was unavailable
because the injury was shoreside, the same limitation on Jones Act suit by a longshoreman
might similarly be applied where the Longshoremen's Act is inapplicable because injury
occurred outside territorial waters. If fatally injured, his representatives might have a
claim under the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68
(1952). In nonfatal cases, the Court could affirm a jury finding of crew member status
and thus allow some remedy.
In rare cases, longshoremen engaged in loading and unloading ships may have such
a permanent connection with the ship as to be held crew members and excluded from
Longshoremen's Act coverage. See, e.g., Coos Bay Lumber Co. v. Pillsbury, 37 F. Supp.
914 (N.D. Cal. 1941).
121. 342 U.S. 187 (1952).
122. See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text.
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form ordinary shoreside jobs on coastal or inland waters. Leaving unresolved
the apparent conflict with its intervening Swanson, Desper and O'Rourke
decisions, the Court has resuscitated the older rule of South Chicago Coal &
Dock Co. v. Bassett 123 which made the crew-member issue one of "fact" with
the fact-finder's determination conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
As a result, certain plaintiffs who are neither harborworkers nor crew members
in the traditional sense have obtained Jones Act tort relief rather than the
exclusive remedy of the Longshoremen's Act. For example, the Court's 1955
decision of Gianfala v. Texas Co.14 affirmed a jury award of Jones Act dam-
ages to a driller injured while working on a barge above an offshore oil field.
Since a Jones Act plaintiff must be a crew member of a vessel engaged in
navigation, 12 5 the Supreme Court necessarily accepted such characterization
by the jury of this oil driller on a barge held to the sea floor by water in its
hold.120 The Court further developed its Gianfala departure last year in Senko
v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp.12 7 That decision accorded seaman and crew-mem-
ber status to a handyman-who usually worked ashore and was injured ashore
-because he did occasional maintenance jobs on a swamp dredge.128 Speaking
to the jurisdictional question, the Court said that "a jury's decision is final if
it has a reasonable basis, whether or not the appellate court agrees with the jury's
estimate."129
123. 309 U.S. 251 (1940). For discussion of the case and its doctrine, see note 137
infra.
124. 350 U.S. 879, reversing per curiam 222 F2d 382 (5th Cir. 1955).
125. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 253 (1940).
126. In overruling the jury's finding, the Fifth Circuit had relied on Desper v. Starved
Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952), as holding that the "crew member of any vessel"
provision of the Longshoremen's Act had been incorporated into the Jones Act and that
a crew member must have some permanent connection with some navigable vessel. 222
F.2d at 387. The circuit court could find no evidence either that plaintiff had such a con-
nection or that this vessel was engaged in navigation. To the contrary, the barge was
moved at most once a year and deceased's "navigational" duties on such occasions were
restricted to turning a valve to pump out the sea water which held the barge stationary
on the bottom. Id. at 384-85.
In reversing, the Supreme Court cited South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett,
supra note 125, Wilkes v. Mississippi River Sand & Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.
1953) (reversing dismissal of Jones Act complaint of construction laborers injured on
barge while shovelling sand being pumped from river bottom), Summerlin v. Massman
Constr. Co., 199 F.2d 715 (4th Cir. 1952) (reversing denial of Jones Act suit for fireman
injured on anchored derrick), and Gahagan Constr. Co. v. Armao, 165 F.2d 301 (1st Cir.
1948) (affirming Jones Act award to deck hand injured on a dredge boat in Boston har-
bor). 350 U.S. at 879.
127. 352 U.S. 370 (1957).
128. Id. at 376. The dissent argued that these duties were "about as nautical as
measuring the depth of a natural swimming pool under construction in marshy ground
• . . [H]is connection was not with the vessel but with the construction gang. He had
no duties connected with navigation; in fact he had never been on the dredge when it
was pushed from one location to another, and never even saw it moved." Id. at 376-77.
129. Id. at 374. This decision was in accord with prior lower court cases allow-
ing the Jones Act remedy for dredge workers. See, e.g., McKie v. Diamond Marine Co.,
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The Supreme Court has applied its Senko doctrine twice so far this year.
In Grimes v. Racuywnd Concrete Pile Co., 30 the Court, overruling a directed
verdict for defendant, remanded for jury determination of whether a pile-
driver operator on a radar tower in the ocean is a "crew member of any
vessel."' 31 And in Butler v. Whiteman,13 2 the Court again reversed a directed
verdict for defendant and remanded for jury trial. There, plaintiff's decedent,
a laborer employed by a tugboat owner to do odd jobs around a wharf,
drowned under unexplained circumstances. According to the trial court, all
three elements of a Jones Act cause of action were missing. 3 3 Decedent could
not have been a crew member of a vessel engaged in navigation, since no steam
had been raised on the tug for over a year and he had had no navigational
duties; the trial court also found no evidence of negligence. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court held that all three issues-vessel in navigation, crew member,
negligence-presented jury questions.13 4
The Gianfala, Senko, Grimes and Butler cases-transforming any scintilla of
evidence of crew membership into a jury question-reflect a general relaxation
204 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1953); Pariser v. City of New York, 146 F.2d 431 (2d Cir.
1945); Early v. American Dredging Co., 101 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1951). But see
Fuentes v. Gulf Coast Dredging Co., 54 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1931) ; United Dredging Co.
v. Lindberg, 18 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1927).
The novelty of Senko was not its allowance of Jones Act recovery for a dredge worker
but its affirmance of crew member status for a worker who spent most of his working
time ashore with a construction gang and was injured ashore. The Court had previously
found crew member status for a full time barge worker. Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S.
565 (1944).
130. 356 U.S. 252 (1958), reversing per curiam 245 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1957).
131. The defense to Jones Act suit had been plaintiff's eligibility under the Defense
Base Act, 55 STAT. 622 (1941), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651-54 (1952), which adopts the
Longshoremen's Act remedy for workers injured while employed outside the continental
United States under a public works contract. The district court had not passed on the crew
member question, wrongly interpreting the Defense Base Act as not incorporating the
provision of the Longshoremen's Act excluding crew members; and held plaintiff to the
compensation remedy even if a crew member. See Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co.,
245 F.2d 437, 439 (1st Cir. 1957). Although this interpretation of the crew member ex-
clusion was seen as error, the court of appeals thought it would be "perfectly futile" to
remand since no evidence existed to support crew member status. Id. at 440.
As a matter of "law," the court of appeals held the permanently stationed radar tower
not to be a vessel; furthermore, even if it were a vessel, plaintiff had no "more or less
permanent connection" with it. Ibid. On appeal, two justices dissented, joining in the deter-
mination that a crew member must be one who is "naturally and primarily on board a
vessel to aid in ... navigation . . . ." 356 U.S. at 254. But the majority thought there was
an "evidentary basis for a jury's finding," both as to crew member status, and as to the
"vessel" question. Id. at 253, citing Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370
(1957), Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U.S. 879 (1955), and South Chicago Coal & Dock Co.
v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940).
132. 356 U.S. 271 (1958), reversing per curiam sub noma. Harris v. Whiteman, 243
F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1957).
133. See Harris v. Whiteman, 243 F.2d 563, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1.957).
134. 356 U.S. at 271.
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of standards for employee tort recoveries by the present Court. With increasing
frequency, certiorari is granted and cases remanded for jury trial following
dismissal of FELA complaints.' 3 5 Within this context, the Senko rationale por-
tends a modified twilight zone of remedial flexibility for all workers on the
seaman-harborworker borderline.'3 6 For a still undefined group, tort damages
135. See note 76 supra. See also Comment, Supreme Court Certiorari Policy and
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 451, 463-64 (1958).
In Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958), the Court held the Jones
Act available even in the absence of negligence if injury resulted from employer's violation
of a safety statute. A seaman aboard a tug was killed by an explosion of petroleum gases,
caused by an open-flame kerosene lamp on a scow under tow. The lamp was at a level of
three feet in violation of a Coast Guard Navigation Rule, specifying a minimum eight-foot
level. The trial court, although finding both a violation of the rule and a causal relation
with the explosion, found no negligence because the scene of the accident had never been
considered a danger area. 141 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 235 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1956).
Because the Jones Act incorporates the provisions of the FELA, see 41 STAT. 1007 (1920),
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952), and the Court had previously imposed absolute liability without
fault for violation of the Safety Appliance Act, 27 STAT. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16 (1952), and the Boiler Inspection Act, 36 STAT. 913 (1911), as amended, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 22-34 (1952), under FELA § 51, these cases were extended to hold that, under the Jones
Act, employers are absolutely liable for violation of a safety statute or regulation. Four
Justices dissented, terming the decision an undue extension of congressional intent by ren-
dering employers liable without fault for violation of any statute, not just the two specified
by Congress. 355 U.S. at 441-52. The dissent concluded: "Thus the Court in effect reads
out of the FELA and the Jones Act the common-law concepts of foreseeability and risk
of harm which lie at the very core of negligence liability, and treats these statutes as mak-
ing employers in this area virtual insurers of the safety of their employees." Id. at 451.
In each of the recent Jones Act cases described in the text-Gianfala, Senko, Grimes
and Butler-vigorous dissents were registered asserting no evidentiary basis for a crew
member finding, and contending that plaintiff should be restricted to the compensation
remedy. The present dissenters are Justices Harlan, Whittaker, Burton and Frankfurter.
Justice Frankfurter dissents specially on his long-standing position that the Court should
not grant certiorari when the issue is evaluation of evidence by the trial court. See Grimes
v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U.S. 252, 253-54 (dissenting opinion); Comment,
43 CORNELL L.Q. 451, 463-65 (1958). Although Justice Frankfurter is unwilling to grant
certiorari when a trial judge has ruled plaintiff ineligible for Jones Act suit as a crew member,
he is apparently willing to review the facts when a jury has determined that plaintiff is
within the Jones Act-although in both situations the facts and issues to be reviewed are
similar. Thus, in Senko, where the jury had found crew member status, Justice Frank-
furter joined in a dissent which stated, "The fact that it was a jury that found Senko to
be 'a member of a crew' does not relieve us of the responsibility for seeing to it that
what is in effect a jurisdictional requirement of the Jones Act is obeyed." 352 U.S. at
378. The effect of Justice Frankfurter's positions in both Grimes and Senko is consistently
to restrict borderline plaintiffs to the compensation remedy and to prevent liberal standards
of negligence from converting the FELA and Jones Act into nonfault statutes. See McAl-
lister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1954) (dissenting opinion) ; Stone v. New York,
C. & St. L.R.R., 344 U.S. 407, 411 (1953) (dissenting opinion); Comment, 43 COmRELL
L.Q. 451, 467 (1958).
136. In fact, the plaintiff in Grimes had already qualified for federal, and in Senko
for state, compensation before bringing their Jones Act suits. 356 U.S. at 255 (dissenting
opinion) ; 352 U.S. at 379 (dissenting opinion). In Gianfala, plaintiff had sued under the
Jones Act, and in the alternative for workmen's compensation under the Louisiana statute.
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will follow a jury finding of negligence and crew membership. And, since com-
pensation commissioners also make awards to borderline claimants, the alterna-
tive twilight zone choice is effected through judicial exercise of the adminis-
trative finality doctrine.137 But courts could reject Jones Act "recovery over"
suits after compensation by analogizing to that same doctrine.
138
The facts of Butler v. Whiteman .3 9 -where the employee was a dockvorker
-suggest that a Jones Act-Longshoremen's Act twilight zone might embrace
all conventional harborworkers. Butler failed to mention the Swanson prece-
dents, however, under which Jones Act coverage for an actual longshoreman is
The alternative remedy was not considered by the courts, in view of affirmance of the
Jones Act count. See 350 U.S. at 879.
137. Where borderline plaintiffs are unable to prove Jones Act negligence, they can
usually obtain compensation, for the federal commissioner's award need rest only on sub-
stantial evidence of non-crew-member status. The leading case is South Chicago Coal &
Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940) (deckhand on small river craft with duty of
guiding coal down chute during refueling of other vessels allowed federal compensation).
Under Bassett, where the award is final no trial de novo is granted, and the "jurisdictional
fact" doctrine of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), discussed notes 88-89 supra, is
not exercised. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237 (1946), as amended,
5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1.1 (1952), the appellate court may not review the facts before the ad-
ministrative agency by trial de novo, but can only apply the substantial evidence rule,
O'Leary v. Brown-PacificMaxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 508 (1951). But if claimant is clear-
ly a crew member, the federal compensation award may be reversed as not resting on sub-
stantial evidence. Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944) (worker with navigation
duties who lived aboard barge) ; Daffin v. Pape, 170 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1948) (part time
crew member of yacht). But cf. Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366
(1953) ; -note 30 supra; GILmoRE & BLACK 352-53. For collected cases defining the con-
tent of "substantial evidence," see PARKER, ADmNISTRATIVE LAw 224-27 (1952).
Courts seem to implement the substantial evidence rule more readily to reverse com-
missioner decisions unfavorable to claimants than to vacate awards. Compare O'Leary
v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., supra; Norton v. Warner Co., Supra, with Myers v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 250 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1957) (reversing, as not supported by the
evidence, deputy commissioner's denial of award to longshoreman's grandchild, the issue
being her status as a "dependent" of deceased under the act) ; Charleston Shipyards, Inc.
v. Lawson, 227 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1955); Ennis v. O'Hearne, 223 F.2d 755 (4th Cir.
1955); O'Leary v. Coastal Nay. Co., 193 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1951). The courts'
proclivity to affirm the deputy commissioner when he makes awards and to overrule him
when he denies them thus complements the Gianfala-Senko-Griines-Butler doctrine and
improves the possibility of free choice of remedy.
138. However, some courts have allowed Longshoremen's Act, then Jones Act "re-
covery over" provided no compensation benefits have actually been received. See, e.g.,
Wilkes v. Mississippi River Sand & Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Segal v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 123 (D.D.C. 1950). Thus, Jones Act recovery is allowed
after a Longshoremen's Act compensation order but before payment. The order is held
not res judicata on the crew member issue because the Longshoremen's Act does not
make an award binding on federal district courts as to jurisdictional issues even after the
period of direct appeal has terminated. See 2 HANNA, EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORK-
MEN'S ComPENsATiox 501-02 (1954) (collecting cases) ; cf. PARKER, op. cit. supra note
137, at 249.
139. See notes 132-34 supra and accompanying text.
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not a jury question but a matter of "law."' 140 The overruling of Swanson and ex-
tension of tort remedies to virtually every harborwvorker is in fact both unlikely
and unwarranted. Present twilight zone decisions are largely restricted to actual
borderline employees. Wholesale application of these precedents would negate
congressional policy dictating limited liability for employers of longshoremen
and would subvert the Longshoremen's Act by making compensation a second-
ary remedy sought only in the absence of negligence. 141
Although Longshoremen's Act compensation is presently available to a re-
stricted group of quasi seamen who also qualify for Jones Act damages, 42
creation of a substantial twilight zone for seamen under Senko-affording ocean-
going mariners federal compensation in the absence of negligence-is improb-
able for two reasons. First, largely because of maritime union antipathy toward
fixed compensation, the Longshoremen's Act explicitly omits crew members
from its coverage, 143 and the Supreme Court has given this exclusion compre-
hensive construction.144 More important, authentic seamen rarely seek compen-
sation because of the ease of proving negligence under the Jones Act 145 and
because they have the alternative remedies in admiralty of "unseaworthiness"
damages and "maintenance and cure." The latter provides certain living costs
and medical expenses attendant upon disability incurred during the term of
employment ;146 the former arises without proof of negligence if injury resulted
140. See notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text.
141. See note 7 supra (Longshoremen's Act § 905(a) the exclusive remedy where
applicable).
142. See notes 8, 137 supra.
143. Longshoremen's Act § 903 (a) (1). On union opposition to inclusion of seamen
within the Longshoremen's Act, see note 159 infra.
144. See, e.g., Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944) (federal compensation
denied crew member of barge).
145. See note 115 supra.
146. "Maintenance" means living expenses during incapacity and is judicially awarded
without proof of fault. The cases vary as to whether maintenance is measured by actual
out-of-pocket expenses or by a flat per diem rate. Union contracts often contain a clause
setting the daily rate which is enforced by the courts. GImoma & BLAcK 267-69. The
"cure" part of the recovery is for medical expenses which continue until recovery or
maximum possible cure. Id. at 262-66. The seaman may also receive unearned wages for
the period of incapacity up to the end of his employment term. Id. at 268.
Seamen prefer maintenance and cure rather than compensation for several reasons.
They are not the exclusive remedy against the employer and may be joined with a Jones
Act or an unseaworthiness count. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928). And
the shipowner's liability includes not only injury or illness arising "out of employment"
-the limit of the compensation statute-but practically all injuries or illnesses which arise
"during" employment regardless of whether they were caused by the worker's performance
of duties. See, e.g., Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938) (maintenance and
cure allowed for Brueger's disease although no causal connection with accident or exertion
on the job). Seamen can collect maintenance and cure even for injuries incurred on shore
leave. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949) (seaman returning to ship fell over
a chain guard into a drydock due to "no negligence but his own") ; Aguilar v. Standard
Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943) (seaman fell into ditch at railroad siding while leaving the
pier for shore leave).
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from defective conditions aboard ship.147 Thus, the Senko doctrine, while
fostering free choice between Jones and Longshoremen's Acts, should not
change the remedies actually sought by most seamen.
THE "LocAL" SEAMAN
While the twilight zone of the Jones and Longshoremen's Acts virtually
assures the borderline seaman a federal compensation award for injury on
navigable waters, 48 his compensability under state law for injury ashore is
less certain. Interpreting the Jones Act as congressional pre-emption of state
remedies for all mariners, some courts deny local relief to harborworker-seamen
on Jensen uniformity grounds. 149 Thus, in the absence of Jones Act negligence,
quasi seamen may be without statutory remedy if injured on land in the
course of employment.' 50 Moreover, traditional admiralty actions for unsea-
worthiness or maintenance and cure may be unavailable in the circumstances
characteristic of Jones Act and state compensation interaction. 15 ' For instance,
147. For description of the unseaworthiness cause of action, see notes 3 supra, 166,
172 infra.
148. See the doctrine of South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251
(1940), discussed note 137 supra.
149. See, e.g., Hardt v. Cunningham, 136 N.J.L. 137, 54 A.2d 782 (1947) (state
compensation denied for barge crew member who drowned in effort to leap from dock
to barge, on grounds doctrine of local concern does not enable state compensation for a
"seaman"); Rudolph v. Industrial Marine Serv., 187 Tenn. 119, 213 S.W2d 30 (1948)
(state compensation denied for seaman fatally injured ashore while on errand for em-
ployer). For the argument that the Jones Act totally pre-empts the field of injuries to
seamen, see 2 LARSON § 90.42.
The leading case on denial of state compensation by a pre-emptive Jones Act, involving
a longshoreman rather than a marginal harborworker-seaman, is Northern Coal & Dock
Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142, 147 (1928). There, claimant longshoreman spent only 2%
of his working time at the "maritime" duty of unloading ships; he was held to be a
"seaman" under the Jones Act and, since that act provides a remedy, "no state statute
can provide any other or a different one." See also Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S.
38 (1930) (reversing award under state wrongful death statute on a "pre-emptive Jones
Act" theory even though deceased's representatives had no cause of action under the
Jones Act for want of actionable negligence) ; Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Cook,
281 U.S. 233 (1930). The Strand and Cook cases may be assumed to have been overruled by
Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946), see notes 119-20 supra and accompanying
text, since they relied on the pre-Longshoremen's Act case of International Stevedoring
Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926), discussed note 116 supra, which had held longshore-
men "seamen" for Jones Act purposes. The Swanson case interpreted the crew member
exception of the Longshoremen's Act to overrule Haverty, placing longshoremen within
the exclusive scope of the Longshoremen's Act.
The pre-emptive Jones Act doctrine is also invoked by borderline Jones Act plaintiffs
to overcome a defense of maritime-but-local. Alaska Industrial Bd. v. Alaska Packers
Ass'n, 186 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1951); Occidental Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 310, 149 P2d 841 (1944). Thus, pre-emptive Jones Act theory exists
today without support from Haverty.
150. The Longshoremen's Act will be unavailable because restricted to injuries on
navigable waters. § 903(a).
151. For examples of cases where, by an unusual combination of circumstances, state
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owner-operators of chartered craft have no unseaworthiness remedy because
they are owners and no maintenance and cure claim because not ordinary
seamen.
1 5 2
If a worker under the Senko rule 153 could gain federal compensation when
injured on navigable waters,154 case law rationally should permit him state
remedy for shoreside injury. An equitable solution could be reached either
by twilight zone free choice r5 between Jones Act and state compensation, or
by affirming state administrative awards on maritime-but-local grounds.156 The
free-choice approach has been adopted by one state court which, citing Davis,
reasoned that the twilight zone "hinges, not upon distinctions between various
compensation was the only available remedy for borderline seamen-harborworkers, see notes
157-58 infra.
In fatal cases, where claimant can show no negligence under the Jones Act, the only
recourse may be state compensation. While most state statutes provide death benefits to
dependents, the traditional admiralty rule is nonsurvival of personal causes of action.
GILMORE & BLACK 302-03. See note 1 supra for description of state statutes. On the main-
tenance and cure remedy, see note 146 supra. Even if the borderline worker were eligible
for maintenance and cure, and the action were held to survive, it would be only for costs and
unearned wages accrued prior to death. Sperbeck v. Burbank & Co., 190 F.2d 449 (2d
Cir. 1951). If the worker dies instantly, his representatives have little recourse under
this action, since no expenses have accrued.
Only occasional litigation involves the maintenance and cure remedy for harborworkers
since plaintiff, to be eligible, must be a "seaman in the primitive sense." GILMORE & BLACK
255. But see Weiss v. Central R.R., 235 F.2d 309, 313 (2d Cir. 1956) (railroad worker,
who lived ashore and had no permanent connection with any vessel but worked part time
on railroad ferry, awarded $5,000 maintenance and cure for reactivation of latent disease
which "some evidence" showed was produced by exertion on job); Chesser v. General
Dredging Co., 150 F. Supp. 592 (S.D. Fla. 1957) (mate on dredge clearing swamp
allowed maintenance and cure as seaman) ; Bailey v. City of New York, 55 F. Supp. 699
(S.D.N.Y. 1944) (maintenance and cure for ferryboat engineer who worked a regular
eight-hour day and slept at home).
As for unseaworthiness, although the action might survive decedent's death, the claim
might be only for damages accrued prior to his death and would probably be exercisable
only under a state wrongful death statute. See Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355
U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958) (dictum) ; cf. Skovgaard v. Tungus, 141 F. Supp. 653 (D.N.J.
1956). Some writers suggest that the traditional rule of nonsurvival in American ad-
miralty law be modified to allow personal representatives of a seaman to collect on an
unseaworthiness count. GiLmowE & BLACK 302-03 n.172. Some recent cases have so held,
utilizing state statutes providing that the personal injury action survives. Halecki v.
United N.Y. and N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n, 251 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1958), 58 COLUm.
L. REv. 736; Holland v. Steag, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1956).
152. The unseaworthiness remedy is available only for shipboard injury because of
violation of the owner's warranty of the ship's seaworthiness. Fredericks v. American
Export Lines, Inc., 227 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956). As to
requirements for maintenance and cure eligibility, see note 151 su pra.
153. See notes 127-34 supra and accompanying text.
154. See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text.
155. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
156. For discussion of the maritime-but-local doctrine, see notes 21-22 supra and
accompanying text.
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types of maritime employees, but upon the maritime employee's choice of the
State compensation remedy as against the overlapping federal remedy avail-
able." 57 A different theory is found in a similar case in which the Fifth
Circuit allowed state compensation by holding the dockside drowning of a
small vessel's captain to be maritime-but-localY 8s This latter rationale
seems the better. Failure to distinguish among "various types" of sea-
men, coupled with complete reliance on the "employee's choice," leads
to the conceptually inconstant inclusion of authentic, ocean-going sea-
men within local law analogous to the federal compensation act from
which Congress, at their behest,5 9 excluded them. 160 On the other hand, courts
could restrict state compensation under maritime-but-local doctrine to shore-
side harborworker injuries noncompensable in admiralty and for which Jones
Act coverage, given negligence, would be problematical.' 61
157. Beadle v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 87 So. 2d 339, 342 (La. Ct. App.
1956). Deceased, the pilot, deckhand and sole crew member of a towboat, drowned while
operating his personally owned motorboat on an errand for his employer. Being clearly a
crew member, federal compensation was unavailable; in the absence of negligence, his
widow could not pursue Jones Act damages. Because the boat was his own, unseaworthiness
was unavailable, and no maintenance and cure expenses had accrued before his death. The
widow's sole remedy was state compensation, which was allowed. The court did not rely
solely on maritime-but-local, which might have sufficed since he was drowned on an inland
river, but chose to rest the decision on the twilight zone theory of the Davis line of cases.
Ibid. For discussion of the Beadle case, see 19 NACCA L.J. 116 (1957).
158. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Toups, 172 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1949). Deceased was the
captain and sole crew member of a harbor boat which carried pilots to seagoing vessels in
Port Arthur, Texas. He drowned when he fell from a dock where he was working. The
court, while admitting he was a seaman engaged in maritime employment and permanent-
ly attached to a vessel-which would justify Jones Act suit if negligence were provable-
found no serious impairment of the uniformity of national admiralty law in allowing state
compensation. Id. at 546.
Although the court stated that "his death occurred in navigable waters of the United
States," id. at 545, it is doubtful that federal compensation could have been claimed, the
traditional rule being that jurisdiction is determined by the point from which the employee
fell, Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935) ; T. Smith & Son, Inc. v.
Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
159. For objections to inclusion of seamen within the Longshoremen's Act by the
International Seamen's Union of America, see Hearings Before the Subcqimlttee on Con-
pensation for Employees in Certain Maritime Employments of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1926) ; cf. Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565,
570 (1944). For argument against the exclusive compensation remedy for seamen by a
maritime labor attorney, see Freedman, Recent Trends in the Controversy Over the Ex-
tension of Workmen's Compensation Into Maritime and Railroad Fields, 4 NACCA L.J.
229 (1949).
160. The Longshoremen's Act § 903(a) (1), by its terms, does not cover masters and
crew members.
161. Maritime-but-local doctrine traditionally excludes ocean-going seamen from state
coverage. See 1 BENEDIcT, AMERICAN ADMIRALTY §§ 34-35 (5th ed. 1925) ; Dickinson &
Andrews, A Decade of Admiralty in the Supreme Court of the United States, 36 CALIF. L.
REv. 169, 179 (1948). Thus, the doctrine could be used to avoid fortuitious hardship to
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The suggested application of the maritime-but-local rationale would not
conform with the view of some courts that the Jones Act, like the FELA,
totally pre-empts state law.162 But so reading the Jones Act ignores congres-
sional intent in passing it. Congress sought to improve chances of recovery
for injured seamen, not to deny pre-existing state remedies for local em-
ployees.1 3 Indeed, during the same period in which it adopted the Jones Act,
Congress was attempting to overcome Jensen and extend state compensation
to all harborworkers. 164 Significantly, the Jones Act did not displace the prior
nonfault remedies of maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness for seamen;165
therefore, supersession of state compensation seems unlikely when alternatives
are unavailable to harborworker-seamen of uncertain status. In sum, maritime-
but-local doctrine would, by its terms, deny state remedies to ocean-going sea-
men; at the same time, it could afford relief to non-negligently injured harbor-
workers on the Jones Act border who are fortuitously denied federal compen-
sation and nonfault suits in admiralty.
IN-PORT UNSEAWORTHINESS
Originally designed to protect ocean-going seamen from the hazards of ship-
board duty, 16 the admiralty doctrine of unseaworthiness has been extended
landward by the Supreme Court on the ground that longshoremen-in loading
and unloading ships-and other harborworkers-in effecting repairs and
maintenance-perform work "traditionally done by seamen.' 06  Moreover, the
Longshoremen's Act, though constituting where applicable the exclusive
ambiguous claimants without benefitting those clearly intended by Congress to have re-
course only to the Jones Act and admiralty remedies.
162. See cases cited note 149 supra.
163. The Jones Act was passed for the specific purpose of overturning Supreme
Court precedent applying the fellow-servant rule to seamen suing for employer negligence.
See GisrioRE & BLAcK 250-51, 279-82.
164. The Jones Act was passed in 1920. Congress passed acts in 1917 and 1922 in an
attempt to authorize state compensation for all harborworkers; both were declared un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
165. Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924) ; GIL ORE & BLAcx 288-96.
166. Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harborworkers, 39 CoRNELL
L.Q. 381, 383 (1954).
Unseaworthiness doctrine, dating from the late nineteenth century, gives seamen a
tort action for injury resulting from any shipboard deficiencies. The doctrine imposes
absolute liability on the shipowner. See, generally, GILMOM & BLAcK 315-33.
167. The unseaworthiness action was first allowed for longshoremen in Atlantic
Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914). The Court reasoned that loading and unload-
ing ships was formerly done by the ship's crew, "but, owing to the exigencies of increasing
commerce and the demand for rapidity and special skill, it has become a specialized service
devolving upon a class 'as clearly identified with maritime affairs as are the mariners "
Id. at 62. For thorough historical exploration of this notion and the conclusion that crew
members have never "traditionally done" such work, see Tetreault, supra note 166, at 412.
The Inibrovck rationale was later utilized to allow other harborworkers the unseaworthi-
ness remedy. See, e.g., Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954) (longshoreman
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remedy against an employer,0 8 reserves to the injured harborworker his rights
against third parties. 69 Hence, a longshoreman injured aboard ship 170 may
often obtain unseaworthiness damages from the shipowner despite concurrent
eligibility for compensation payments from his employer-usually a stevedor-
ing company. 17 ' Because the unseaworthiness doctrine imposes an absolute,
undelegable liability for any deficiency in equipment or personnel, 17 2 a long-
shoreman may recover against the shipowner even if the cause of injury was
negligence by the worker's own employer or his fellow longshoremen and the
ship was within the stevedoring company's sole control during loading opera-
tions. 73 Under the practice sanctioned by the 1956 decision of Ryan Steve-
doring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 174 however, the shipowner, once judged
liable to the longshoreman, can recover over from the stevedoring company
injured aboard ship by defective block); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406
(1953) (carpenter injured aboard ship) ; Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946)
(longshoreman injured by boom shackle aboard ship) ; GmmORE & BIACK 315-33, 344-58
(collecting cases).
Extension of the unseaworthiness remedy to harborworkers has not been unlimited.
See, e.g., Berryhill v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 238 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1956) (no unsea-
worthiness remedy for shoreside machinist injured aboard ship); Gill v. S.S. Tancred,
1958 Am. Mar. Cas. 670, 673 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (unseaworthiness recovery denied steam-
fitter repairing badly damaged vessel) ; Manera v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.
N.Y. 1954) (same for repairman injured while cleaning tanks aboard ship).
168. Longshoremen's Act § 905, quoted note 7 supra.
169. "If on account of a disability or death for which compensation is payable under
this chapter the person entitled to such compensation determines that some person other
than the employer is liable in damages, he may elect... to receive such compensation or to
recover damages against such third person." Longshoremen's Act § 933 (a). But once
claimant has accepted compensation under an award, his rights against third parties are
assigned to the employer. Id. § 933 (b).
170. Unseaworthiness recovery is available only for shipboard injury. See note 152
supra.
171. See, e.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
172. Ibid. (shipowner liable for defect not discoverable by prudent inspection). The
Court defined the shipowner's liability as follows: "It is essentially a species of liability
without fault, analogous to other well known instances in our law. Derived from and
shaped to meet the hazards which performing the service imposes, the liability is neither
limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character. . . . It is a form of
absolute duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian policy." Id. at 94-95. For
a case involving shipowner liability for employee torts against fellow employees, see
Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) (plaintiff, injured by "belligerent"
shipmate, eligible for unseaworthiness damages).
173. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). Some federal courts have
recently indicated that they will restrict unseaworthiness actions against shipowners by
denying recovery when injury was clearly caused solely by employer's negligence, or by
refusing to categorize certain harborworkers as seamen. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik
Fisser, 249 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1957) (longshoreman injured by loading boom negligently
handled by stevedoring crew) ; Owens v. United States, 1958 Am. Mar. Cas. 216 (S.D.
Fla. 1957) (shoreside ship repair inspector injured aboard ship) ; Filipek v. Moore-lvc-
Cormack Lines, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (ship's rigger and boom tester).
174. 350 U.S. 124 (1956). See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 581 (1957).
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if injury resulted from the company's negligent performance of contractual
duties.'70
When sued for recovery over by shipowners, employers theoretically could
rely successfully on the exclusive-remedy clause in the Longshoremen's Act.
That provision limits employer liability "on account of" injury in the course
of employment to the schedule of compensation payments set forth in the act."76
But in approving recovery over, the Court avoided this limitation by postu-
lating a contract of indemnity between employer and shipowner.1 77 Thus, the
longshoreman can indirectly achieve tort recovery from his employer through
an unseaworthiness action; and the exclusive-remedy provision-an integral
part of the congressional plan for workmen's compensation-is effectively
nullified.178
175. In Ryan, plaintiff longshoreman was injured by cargo negligently stowed by his
fellow longshoremen. The Supreme Court, affirming full indemnification from employer to
shipowner, said:
"The shipowner here holds [employer's] ... uncontroverted agreement to perform all
of the shipowner's stevedoring operations at the time and place where the cargo in question
was loaded. That agreement necessarily includes petitioner's obligation -not only to stow the
pulp rolls, but to stow them properly and safely. Competency and safety of stowage are
inescapable elements of the service undertaken. This obligation is not a quasi-contractual
obligation implied in law or arising out of a noncontractual relationship. It is of the essence
of petitioner's stevedoring contract. It is petitioner's warranty of workmanlike service that
is comparable to a manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured product."
350 U.S. at 133-34.
For thorough discussion of Ryan. and the issues involved in recovery over, see GILoRE
& BLAcK 358-74.
176. Longshoremen's Act § 905, quoted note 7 supra.
177. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
178. See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 581, 585 (1957).
Under § 933(b) of the Longshoremen's Act, acceptance of compensation under an
award operates as an assignment to the employer of the third-party action; §§ 919(a) - (c)
enables the employer to initiate the claim for compensation. Therefore, foreseeing in-
demnification action by the shipowner, an employer may attempt to force a formal award
on claimant and then abandon the third-party claim. In Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silver-
cloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956), the longshoreman obtained a compensation award. However,
the employer's insurance company to whom the assigned third-party action had been subro-
gated did not proceed against the shipowner. To protect the longshoreman's right to gain
unseaworthiness damages, the Supreme Court held that he could sue even after receiving
a formal award when he is "the only person with sufficient adverse interest to bring suit."
Id. at 531. The decision was a supposed solution to the concern expressed by Justice
Black in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., supra note 177, at 135-47
(dissenting opinion), that in allowing shipowner's recovery over the Court was forcing
employers to prevent employees from receiving unseaworthiness damages. Justice Black
feared that the threat of recovery over would prompt employers to cease making voluntary
compensation payments without award, a practice which allowed claimant to retain his
third-party action.
The Czaplicki doctrine has been criticized as not effectively protecting employees.
See, e.g., Note, 66 YALE L.J. 581, 586-87 (1957). For in that case, the Court said: "[A]I1
that we hold is that, given the conflict of interests and inactio, by the assignee, the employee
should not be relegated to any rights he may have against the assignee, but can maintain
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According unseaworthiness damages to shoreside personnel perverts ad-
miralty doctrine while further confusing the relation of seaman remedies to har-
borworkers. 17 9 The shipowner warranty of seaworthiness, a court-created "ob-
ligation growing out of the status of the seaman and his peculiar relationship
to the vessel," was initially designed to benefit persons "exposed to the perils
of the sea and all the risks of unseaworthiness . . . ."18 An actual seaman lacks
statutory protection absent employer negligence ;181 but Davis free-choice doc-
trine assures harborworkers fixed compensation granted by both state and
federal laws.182 For them, unseaworthiness constitutes gratuitous superimpo-
sition of tort protection above the enacted schedules. Furthermore, ordinary long-
shoremen, having been legislatively restricted to compensation act coverage, 8 3
are clearly not seamen within the Jones Act.18 4 Transforming these same long-
shoremen into seamen for purposes of unseaworthiness damages thus creates
a twilight zone resting on an obviously anomalous classification.5 5 Made
possible solely by the fortuitious introduction of a third-party shipowner, and
frustrating congressional efforts to distinguish harborworker and seaman reme-
dies, this twilight zone represents an unwarranted importation of maritime
remedies onto the waterfront.
the third-party action himself." 351 U.S. at 532. (Emphasis added.) The employer, after
obtaining a formal award may, as the employee's assignee, compromise the third-party
claim by settling with the shipowner to the extent of compensation paid and expenses
incurred, with the employee getting nothing over the compensation level. See Note, 66
YALE L.J. 581, 586-87 (1957).
However, where employee is well-advised, he could avoid this denial of his unsea-
worthiness remedy by refusing to accept payments under a formal award obtained
by the employer. Assignment of the action could thus be avoided. Justice Black's Ryan
objection assumed that the making of the award operated to assign the action. In fact, the
statute specifies that, "Acceptance of such compensation under an award . . . shall operate
as an assignment .... § 933(b). (Emphasis added.) Thus, an employee should be able to
retain his third-party action by refusing to accept compensation payments. His choice
would depend on immediate financial need and prospective chances of success on the un-
seaworthiness claim.
179. Extension of the remedy to longshoremen is criticized in Tetreault, supra note
166, at 391-403; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 581, 587-88 (1957). ,
180. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
181. The only remedial federal statute not requiring proof of negligence is the Long-
shoremen's Act, which specifically excludes "crew members." § 903 (a) (1). And an
ocean-going seaman would not qualify for state compensation under the doctrine of a
pre-emptive Jones Act. See cases cited note 149 supra. Of course, seamen qualify for
nonstatutory, non-negligent relief in the form of maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness
damages.
182. Under Davis, the harborworker benefits from a presumption in favor of his
choice of remedy-state or federal. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
18 3. Longshoremen's Act § 905; Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946).
184. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
185. For example, the Swanson case, barring longshoremen from Jones Act suit be-
cause they do not qualify for "seaman" status, was handed down by the Court on the same
day as Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), which held longshoremen to




Assuming claimant's free choice of remedy, no justification appears for "re-
covery over" after a state compensation award. To the contrary, permitting
the second recovery misconstrues the purpose of the federal remedy and sub-
verts the principle of elective relief central to the twilight zone. Sanctioning
free choice is not intended to maximize relief at the cost of administrative
finality but to assure injured employees that their initial claims will not be
disallowed on jurisdictional grounds. Conceptually justifiable only when the
worker's status is ambiguous under applicable compensation law, the twilight
zone does not imply repeated awards dictated by claimant opportunism.
Injured harborworkers on other statutory borderlines present problems
suggesting twilight zone solution. Railroad employees who generally work
ashore but are fortuitiously injured on navigable waters are presently deprived
of FELA damages because federal compensation is available. Retention of
their.customary relief appears preferable to nice distinctions creating exceptions
to congressional coverage of railway liability. Because of the disparate reme-
dies at issue, jury characterization of the plaintiff's employment duties, not
free choice, could determine FELA applicability. This treatment would accord
with Jones Act precedent allowing certain harborworker-seamen to take to
the jury the issue of plaintiff eligibility under the act. Analogously, other
harborworker-seamen, non-negligently hurt ashore but currently denied com-
pensation, could have a state commissioner resolve whether injury was mari-
time-but-local. On the other hand, to avoid negation of the exclusive recovery-
limited liability clause basic to the Longshoremen's Act, harborworkers clearly
within the act should not receive unseaworthiness damages. Thus, in sum,
modified twilight zone recovery based on jurisdictional determinations by
triers of fact can and should be allowed only when ambiguity of status indicates
remedial flexibility. Extending twilight zone doctrine beyond borderline cases
would pervert judicial doctrine designed to simplify areas of statutory overlap,
and defeat Congress' selective distribution of available relief by category of
waterfront employment.
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